DIVERSITY GONE WRONG: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO THE
EVOLVING MEANING OF DIVERSITY FROM BAKKE TO FISHER
Ofra Bloch*
Diversity has played an unparalleled role in America’s affirmative action law and politics, most recently in Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II). However, our understanding of diversity is insufficient,
particularly in the arena of higher education. This Article aims to enhance this understanding by offering a
sociohistorical account of how the diversity rationale has evolved over time, which supplements the existing literature
that has focused on judicial decisions. By analyzing the numerous amicus briefs filed before the Supreme Court
in cases challenging affirmative action over the years, this Article demonstrates that questions about the value of
diversity in higher education were not settled in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke or
subsequent cases, but rather were renegotiated by citizens and officials. The Article then shows how judicial and
professional understandings of diversity have shifted from egalitarian notions of racial equality towards marketdriven utilitarian ideals. In turn, this utilitarian framework has come to shape the way universities and student
activists think, talk, and act regarding questions of racial justice. It has steered the public vocabulary and
imagination away from identifying past and present racial inequality, as well as its relevance to the mission of
higher education.
The Article concludes by suggesting that it is imperative to reinfuse diversity with egalitarian ideals. Universities
and others who invoke diversity claims in courts or on campus should not only acknowledge the utilitarian benefits
of diversity that make affirmative action less controversial, but also keep sight of the egalitarian perspective that is
at the core of racial justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Racial diversity eliminates racial identifiability; racial identifiability is important
evidence of segregation and discrimination . . . . Considering race and ethnicity in
admissions alleviates past and present inequalities and discrimination . . . .
Diversity, desegregation, and past discrimination are doctrinally distinct, but
factually, they are deeply interconnected.
—Amicus Brief, Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)1
Put simply, students need to learn how to work with, market to, and buy from
people from diverse backgrounds and cultures.
—Amicus Brief, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (2013)2

Diversity has played a growing role in shaping America’s affirmative
action law and politics—most recently in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
(Fisher II)3—determining questions of access to higher education. Over the
years, the United States Supreme Court has embraced the value of diversity
as the primary rationale for sanctioning the consideration of race in higher
education admissions policies.4 Nowadays, the question of how universities
define their interest in diversity not only plays a role in licensing or restricting
such policies in court, but also shapes the public conversation about racial
justice on campus.5 Our understanding of this concept however, remains
insufficient. What makes diversity a constitutionally compelling interest?
What values does it express? And most importantly, when do diversity claims
promote equality and when do they inhibit it?
In an attempt to begin answering these questions, this Article offers a
sociohistorical account of diversity in the realm of higher education. It shows
how, despite doctrinal constraints imposed by the Court, questions about the
role of affirmative action in higher education were not settled in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke 6 or thereafter, but forged in an ongoing
conversation over the value of diversity. The meaning of diversity, the
1
2
3
4
5
6

Brief of Am. Law Deans Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter ALDA Brief, Grutter].
Brief of Amherst et al., Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Amherst Brief, Fisher I].
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210, 2215 (2016) (upholding the University of Texas at Austin’s affirmative action
program and noting that diversity constitutes a compelling interest).
Except for the narrow and mostly dormant interest in remedying specific instances of institutional
racial discrimination. See infra Part II and especially notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 16 (2003) (explaining how diversity has
become a “mantra” in educational circles (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also infra Part VI.B.
438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (stating that “the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a
university’s admissions program”).
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Article reveals, has been and still is subject to continuous contestation and
development. Analyzing the numerous amicus curiae briefs filed before the
Supreme Court in the cases challenging higher-education affirmative action,
the Article explores the evolving meaning of the diversity rationale. It
uncovers how remedial interests, which were rejected in Bakke, as well as
other egalitarian and democratic values, found their way back into the
conversation over affirmative action through the different interpretations of
diversity in the briefs and by the Court.
This Article then reveals that convictions about the value of diversity are
dynamic and have shifted over time. It shows how, through ongoing conflict
over affirmative action, the constitutional understanding of diversity has
drifted away from notions of equal citizenship and racial equity towards
market-driven interests that focus on preparing students for a diverse and
global workforce. These interests celebrate differences, but are divorced
from the history of state-enforced hierarchies that affirmative action was
originally set to dismantle. Thus, the meaning assigned to diversity has most
notably existed along a spectrum. One end of the spectrum vindicates
egalitarian values that include both retrospective, remedial ideals, and
prospective interests in equal citizenship; the other end is what I call the
utilitarian conception of diversity, invoking pedagogical and other functional
benefits, and most dominantly relying on the business case for diversity, 7
aiming to benefit the professional training of students and foster the
economy. The transformation from an egalitarian understanding of diversity
to a utilitarian one might have garnered much-needed support for the
practice of affirmative action, but at a cost: that of neglecting the history of
discrimination and obscuring the persistence of racial inequality when
defining the mission of higher education. These costs, I suggest, are evident
in the recent wave of student activism.
Debates about affirmative action are debates about equal opportunity
and how it should be structured as a matter of legal doctrine and educational
policy. In other words, because affirmative action is one of the few
institutional reactions to racial inequality, important questions of law and
equality are at stake in how the courts and universities describe their
commitment to affirmative measures. Critical scholarship that started
appearing after Bakke warned that a diversity rationale (as opposed to
remedial and distributive rationales) is far from being a viable means of
ensuring affirmative action, and that it is actually “a serious distraction in the
ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice.”8 This Article aligns somewhat with

7
8

See infra note 43.
Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003). For a more detailed
survey of the critical scholarship on diversity sparked by Bakke, see infra notes 73–76, as well as notes
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this critical tradition, but departs from it in significant ways. It draws
predominantly on democratic constitutionalism scholarship and employs the
understanding that formal law-making and adjudication are platforms for
democratic deliberation, through which changes in legal and constitutional
understandings of citizens and officials take place.9 Investigating the amicus
briefs, this Article explores how changes in professional and judicial
understandings of diversity were forged through the interaction between
university officials and social movements inside and outside of courtrooms.
While the Court has settled some questions of law, on which the
scholarship on diversity has centered, 10 this Article recognizes that nonjudicial actors also had a significant impact on shaping the value of diversity.
Thus, instead of treating diversity as a term with fixed meaning determined
by the Court, I turn to the amicus briefs—focusing especially on those filed
by university officials, higher education organizations, and students—to
uncover how convictions about the value of diversity in higher education
have shifted over the years. This untold history of diversity’s constitutional
meaning allows for a more nuanced critique—not of a theoretical conception
of diversity, but of what it has come to mean over time and the role it has

9
10

262–66 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
Doctrinal analyses have dominated the legal scholarship on diversity in the realm of higher
education. To name but a few examples, see Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The
Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381–82, 84 (1998)
(discussing the “compelling interest” test and its implications to the diversity rationale). See generally
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996) (discussing
the importance of diversity in light of the jurisprudence that followed Bakke). For more recent
examples, see generally Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of
Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113 (2012) (discussing Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine in the then forthcoming Fisher I decision). Despite the article’s title, it does
not include a discussion concerning the meaning of diversity, but discusses doctrinal alternatives
that would allow universities to continue pursuing their educational benefits. Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson, Comment, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an Excellent
Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185 (2016) (considering how universities can advance diversity postFisher II). Other scholars broaden their doctrinal investigation and focus on normative questions—
namely, when a state should seek to promote diversity. For comprehensive normative accounts,
see generally PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE (2003) and LEVINSON, supra note 5.
For a survey of the critical scholarship and its focus on jurisprudence, see infra notes 73–76,
262–67 and accompanying text. The critiques of diversity are, of course, not limited to the legal
literature. For an incredibly extensive account of diversity discourse, see generally ELLEN BERREY,
THE ENIGMA OF DIVERSITY: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE AND THE LIMITS OF RACIAL JUSTICE
(2015) (investigating the symbolic politics of diversity and showing how the shift to diversity
legitimates and delegitimizes racial hierarchies). Despite Berrey’s deep understanding of the
ambiguity of diversity, she treats legal doctrine as an external and fixed factor that influences the
organizational culture of diversity. Thus, even when acknowledging the ambiguous nature of
diversity, both the doctrinal and critical literatures on diversity have failed to account for its evolving
constitutional meaning. This Article seeks to fill this gap and to provide an account of the
interaction between judicial and non-judicial actors that has shaped the value of diversity over time.
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played in both promoting and inhibiting equality. And thus, instead of
overthrowing the diversity framework as a whole or seeking to supplement it
with external rationales, like many critical legal scholars have proposed,11 I
suggest what can and should be done under existing law of affirmative action.
In Bakke and subsequent cases, the Court imposed constraints on the
rationales that can justify affirmative action in the realm of higher education,
rejecting explicit remedial rationales while allowing the use of race-conscious
measures to promote educational benefits that result from student-body
diversity.12 Scholars have mainly focused on these restrictions,13 but for the
argument this Article lays out, they serve only as a point of departure. The
Article first uncovers that although the Court’s jurisprudence restricted these
rationales, the value of diversity was re-negotiated and unsettled by other
actors, and the debate over rationales for affirmative action was re-opened
through a backdoor. Analyzing the amicus briefs filed to the Court in Gratz
v. Bollinger 14 and Grutter v. Bollinger 15 (together “the Michigan cases”) by
universities and other amici, I show that both prospective and retrospective
egalitarian interests were not eliminated from the debate over affirmative
action, but were reinfused into a more covert conversation over the value of
diversity. Both the litigants and most of the amici formally complied with
the Court’s restrictions and did not openly invoke an interest in rectifying the
wrongs of the past, yet their interpretations of diversity were informed by
remedial and other egalitarian and democratic values.
Second, the Article analyzes the conversation that evolved in this space of
meaning-making over the years. By comparing the content of the amicus
briefs filed in Grutter and Gratz (2003) with those filed in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin (Fisher I) (2013) 16 and Fisher II (2016), 17 I show how
constitutional understandings of diversity shifted from remedial and
distributive notions about the role of higher education towards utilitarian,
mostly market-driven, concerns. Despite the expansive interpretation
adopted by the Court in Grutter, which included both instrumental and
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

See, e.g., Bell, supra note 8, at 1622 (listing four reasons why diversity is actually a way for universities
to continue admitting children of wealth and privilege); see also Richard Delgado, Why Universities
Are Morally Obligated to Strive for Diversity: Restoring the Remedial Rationale for Affirmative Action, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1997) (arguing that diversity must be supplemented with a remedial
rationale for affirmative action); Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1803, 1810 (2000) (explaining why diversity is dangerous when understood as the only rationale for
affirmative action).
See infra Part II and particularly infra notes 54–58. Bakke was a plurality opinion, but it was later
affirmed in Grutter and more recently in Fisher I and Fisher II.
See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
570 U.S. 297 (2013).
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
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egalitarian, as well as democratic interests in fighting social exclusion,18 for
the amici in the Fisher litigation, diversity was mostly a utilitarian, marketoriented interest, divorced from any remedial aspirations or from more
prospective ideals of distribution and equal citizenship. Their business case
for diversity was decoupled from egalitarian values and committed to the
economic well-being and success of students preparing to enter the
heterogeneous workforce.
Third, the Article employs this historical account to explore the question
of when diversity claims promote equality and when they restrict it, and to
develop a better understanding of the tradeoffs in arguing about diversity in
one way or another. The Article explores the reasons for and benefits of
adopting a utilitarian approach to diversity and proceeds to critically
examine this development. I argue that, over time, diversity was resignified to
legitimate the persistence of racial hierarchies. 19 The dynamic of
resignification is a way in which prior standards of critique and reform are
adopted in a diluted and modified way that can help the system gain
legitimacy without disrupting its overall practices and structure. 20 This
concept is central to comprehending what is at stake in abandoning the
egalitarian interpretation of diversity in the struggle for racial justice.
Diversity is possibly the most dominant form of public discourse about
race on campus today. The way we talk and think about diversity in courts
and on campus affects the way that we and our institutions approach
questions of racial justice. Amicus briefs are, to a large degree, strategic, and
surely they do not represent the only conversation about race that is taking
place in universities. However, amicus briefs both reflect and shape
convictions about the value of diversity.21 The utilitarian framework that is
revealed in the Fisher I briefs conceptualizes diversity in ahistorical and
instrumental terms, providing a way to talk about race in symbolic and
indirect terms of identity and culture, without bringing up racism or
inequality. And thus, I argue, it works to obscure their existence and
legitimizes their persistence by making them invisible and irrelevant to the
project of affirmative action, as well as to the mission of higher education. In
other words, the popular utilitarian framework steers the public language
and imagination away from identifying past and present racial injustices, as
well as their relevance to the mission of higher education.

18
19

20
21

See infra Part III.B.
See Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History, in FORTUNES OF FEMINISM: FROM
STATE-MANAGED CAPITALISM TO NEOLIBERAL CRISIS 219 (2013) (discussing the process of
resignification in the context of second-wave feminism which shifted attention away from
redistribution and toward recognition). For a broad discussion on resignification, see infra Part VI.B.
Fraser, supra note 19, at 218.
See infra Part VI.B and particularly infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
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While these costs might sound theoretical or abstract, the Article suggests
that we might already be witnessing some of the implications of the allutilitarian approach to questions of race in the recent wave of student
activism. Thus, the Article turns to explore the relationship between the
takeover of the utilitarian conception of diversity and student demands on
campus. In recent years, students all over the United States have been
mobilizing around demands for renaming buildings on campus, adopting
trigger warnings, and establishing safe spaces.22 Of course, each of these
demands should be debated on its own merits and in context, and the Article
does not take a stand in this nuanced discussion, but proposes that the costs
of adopting a market-driven and identity-centered approach to questions of
racial justice are evident in these demands. This movement can be
understood as a form of backlash to the utilitarian paradigm that has been
controlling the conversation on race in the past decade, and aspiring to get
their institutions to acknowledge the wrongs of the past and to commit, once
again, to rectifying them. However, the demands resulting from this
backlash appear to be confined to similar symbolic conceptions of race as
identity and culture rather than as a category of power, and thus risk
sustaining racial stratification in the effort to resist it.
This Article shows that diversity is fundamentally and historically
ambiguous, and can accommodate conservative as well as progressive ideals
about race and inequality. In the past decade, diversity has come to embody
mostly market-driven commitments. This shift risks undermining the longterm struggle for racial equality by diverting our institutional attention away
from the ways in which race still shapes educational opportunities to the impact
of diversity on economic success, making us morally numb to the hierarchical
status quo. It is imperative, I suggest, to reinfuse the concept of diversity with
egalitarian ideals, honestly acknowledging the persistence of racial inequality
and holding universities accountable for their part in sustaining it. Thus,
instead of rejecting this body of law, I suggest that universities and others who
invoke diversity claims in courts or in schools should do so with attention to
both the advantages of utilitarian diversity that make it popular even among
many conservatives, and its cost of undermining the struggle for racial equality,
and try to strike a balance between the two approaches. One, relatively
feasible way of doing so is to return to past interpretations of diversity that
embraced both utilitarian and egalitarian values.
In the past decade of affirmative action case law—from Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, through Fisher I, to Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action—the Court has imposed growing constraints

22

See infra Part VI.C.
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on affirmative action policies and on diversity efforts.23 In contrast, in the
recent Fisher II decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, determined
that, in defining student body diversity, considerable deference is owed to the
universities. 24 This deference, I argue, has reopened the space for
constitutional meaning-making. This space, I suggest, should be used by
universities and advocates as an opportunity to re-infuse diversity with
egalitarian values, which have been lost over time, but remain very relevant
today. More concretely, as race-conscious affirmative action policies are
continually challenged, 25 and with diversity being the only permissible
rationale to license such policies in the near future, universities should frame
their interest in diversity so that it reflects their commitment not only to the
success of their students in the workforce, but also to equal citizenship.
The Article proceeds in seven parts: Part I introduces the taxonomy of
egalitarian, utilitarian, and democratic conceptions of diversity, which is used
in the following parts to identify the historical transformations in the meaning
of diversity. Part II describes the constraints on affirmative action practice
and discourse that the Court posed in Bakke. Part III explores how, despite
these constraints, questions about the role of affirmative action in higher
education were not settled by the Court, but were constantly forged in an
ongoing conversation over the value of diversity. Part IV shows how judicial
and professional understandings of diversity have, over time, drifted away
from retrospective and prospective egalitarian logics towards pedagogical
and market-oriented, utilitarian interests. Part V analyzes the most recent
affirmative action case, Fisher II, and conceives of this decision as a re-opened
space for constitutional meaning-making as well as an opportunity to infuse
diversity with old and new commitments. Part VI draws on this account of
diversity’s transformation to consider the stakes in arguing about diversity in
one way or another. It explores how the dominant utilitarian approach to
diversity takes part in shaping the public discussion about racial justice and
probes possible implications it might have had on recent student activism.
Part VII concludes by asking how diversity might be enhanced, and teases
23

24
25

Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630, 1635 (2014); Fisher I, 133 S.
Ct. 2411, 2415, 2419–21 (2013); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 729–32 (2007). For a brief discussion of the constraints imposed by these cases, see infra
Part V.B and particularly infra notes 236–39.
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) (finding that “[t]he University has thus met its burden of showing that
the admissions policy it used at the time it rejected petitioner’s application was narrowly tailored”).
Two lawsuits challenging race-conscious admissions policies are currently pending: Complaint &
Demand for Jury Trial at 43, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard
Coll., No. 1:14-cv-14176-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2014) (alleging that Harvard discriminates
against Asian-Americans in admissions); Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 21–22, Students
for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 1:14-cv-00954 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2014)
(challenging the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s (“UNC-Chapel Hill”) admissions
policy by claiming that race-neutral alternatives are available to UNC-Chapel Hill).
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out possible lessons for how universities and other advocates of affirmative
action could invoke diversity claims in a way that boosts equality more than
it discourages it.
I. A PRELIMINARY TAXONOMY: EGALITARIAN, UTILITARIAN, AND
DEMOCRATIC
Between 1978 and 2016 five major Supreme Court cases had grappled
with the value of diversity in higher education: Bakke in 1978, the Michigan
cases challenging the undergraduate and law school’s admissions policies in
2003, and the twice-reviewed Fisher case finally decided in 2016. While some
commitment to diversity can be traced more than a century back,26 diversity
only began to factor into higher education law and policy significantly after
Justice Powell introduced it as the primary justification for affirmative action
in Bakke.27 Each of the cases that followed Bakke produced more than seventy
amicus briefs expressing different perceptions about the value of diversity.
Looking at diversity over this period of time, the Article reveals that its
meaning was never fixed, but dynamic and constantly renegotiated. More
concretely, the Article uncovers two main historical transformations in the
meaning of diversity: the first took place between Bakke and the Michigan
cases, and the second took place between the Michigan cases and the Fisher I
litigation. In order to identify these shifts, the Article adopts a taxonomy that
contrasts an egalitarian understanding of diversity with a utilitarian
understanding. I focus on these two poles of interpretation not only because
of their dominancy, but also because they enable me to capture the
significant changes in the meaning of diversity. However, I recognize a third
strand of interests in diversity, which I call the democratic meaning of diversity.
This understanding articulates a national commitment to cultural pluralism
as a democratic imperative. While this dimension has stayed somewhat more
constant over the years, its connection to egalitarian ideals faded between the
Michigan cases and Fisher. This taxonomy allows me to characterize the
values that litigants, amici, and courts attributed to diversity, and to
recognize when one set of values prevailed over the other.
The proposed taxonomy adopts a traditional division from the
philosophical literature between egalitarian and utilitarian rationales for and
against affirmative action. Egalitarian arguments are those which aim to
promote or maintain a certain conception of equality (such as substantive or
26

27

DAVID B. OPPENHEIMER, ARCHIBALD COX AND THE DIVERSITY JUSTIFICATION FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 10, 16 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913310 (tracing Harvard’s
commitment to diversity all the way back to the beginning of the twentieth century); see also infra
Part II and particularly infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II and particularly infra notes 58, 71–72 and accompanying text.
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formal, remedial or distributive, and so on). 28 Utilitarian arguments are
varied as well, but are basically concerned with maximizing the welfare of
the majority. Utilitarian aspirations are not simply instrumental or
functional, but they seek to promote some kind social utility above all.29
Although this is a generalized and abstract formulation of these two strands
as “ideal types,”30 it emphasizes that while the former focuses on equality as
a value inherent in diversity, for the latter diversity is a pure means to achieve
other social goods that might align with, or be indifferent or even in
opposition to, equality. In what follows, a more nuanced and detailed
taxonomy is presented, developed by drawing on both the theoretical
literature and the actual arguments that appear in the amicus briefs and
judicial opinions. In Parts II, III and IV of the Article, the taxonomy is
grounded in examples, as it is used to classify the dominant strands of values
attributed to diversity along a spectrum of meanings, and to identify when
one strand prevails.
The egalitarian rationale for diversity can be divided into two main
groups of values: remedial and distributive. The remedial diversity framework
appeals to notions of corrective justice. It is mostly backward-looking,
aspiring to diversity as part of the historical struggle to redress the persistent
effects of past discrimination. It aims to create a society in which members
of historically disadvantaged groups enjoy the opportunities and status they
would have had in life had they not been affected by the wrongs of the past,
and in that sense it provides a kind of social remedy. Originally, remedial
rationales for affirmative action had compensatory elements.31 In its current
formulation as an interest in diversity, the aspiration to ameliorate the
unequal status quo caused by discrimination and segregation is motivated
28

29

30

31

See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 116–32 (1991) (explaining how egalitarian arguments are used in the
affirmative action debate).
See, e.g., id. at 95–132 (reviewing the different moral arguments for and against affirmative action
developed in the literature); Buchan T.A. Love, Justifying Affirmative Action, 7 AUCKLAND U.L. REV.
491, 492, 495 (1993) (categorizing the justifications for affirmative action into three main groups:
“Equality of Opportunity,” “Distributive Justice,” and “Utilitarian Justifications,” the first two of
which are egalitarian in nature and classified according to whether they aim to achieve equality of
opportunity or of outcome).
Max Weber developed the analytical tool of “ideal types,” which serves to measure and identify the
social phenomena in relation to a pure theoretical form of social construct. It is meant to stress
certain common elements of a phenomenon. See Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social
Policy, in MAX WEBER ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (Edward A. Shils &
Henry A. Finch eds., trans., 1949); see also Sung Ho Kim, Max Weber, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/.
See, e.g., E LIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 137–41 (2010) (reviewing
the compensatory rationale and explaining that “[i]n this model, if a person has suffered from
wrongdoing, she is entitled to compensation from the wrongdoer, to the extent of the damages the
wrong inflicted on her”).
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mostly by a sense of collective or institutional responsibility towards
historically disadvantaged groups.32
The distributive diversity framework is forward-looking and focused on
whether all people have a fair share of benefits, opportunities and status.33 It
is rooted in the commitment to creating a society in which no group is
systematically excluded from educational opportunities and positions of
leadership.34 Under this justification, a diverse student body is a value in
itself, as it embodies a more just distribution of those opportunities. In some
cases, this rationale is tied to the democratic understanding of diversity—
promoting a substantive vision of American democracy, under which all
citizens are equals who enjoy equal opportunities and participation—on
which I will elaborate later in this Part.35 For both egalitarian frameworks
the main beneficiaries are disadvantaged groups (rather than the majority
group, individuals, the society, or the market), and race is not a proxy for
some other characteristic, but a central category of hierarchy and power.36
In some instances, the two frameworks appear as complementary to one
another, and in others they appear as independent interests in diversity.
The anti-stereotyping strand of interest in diversity is also worth
mentioning. It aims to eliminate racial stereotypes and overcome racial
divisiveness and isolation by increasing classroom diversity.37 Diversity here
is valued for its potential to fight prejudice and bias by refuting stereotypes
and stigmas. When pursued for its own sake or as part of a larger struggle
against discrimination, it should be understood as espousing an egalitarian
goal.38 However, it is often the case that breaking down racial stereotypes
and overcoming social divisiveness are pursued only with the utilitarian and
market-driven motivations to promote a more efficient work environment
and a better learning process. As Ralph Richard Banks and Richard Ford
extensively point out “[i]f people accept the eradication of unconscious bias

32
33
34

35
36
37

38

See infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 106–20 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
The distributive rationale aims to eliminate group hierarchies and can thus be understood as
espousing antisubordination values. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004)
(explaining the distinction between an antisubordination and an anticlassification conception of
equal protection).
See infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 107–35 and accompanying text.
See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 83, 106 (2010) (tracing the origins of the anti-stereotyping principle to the civil rights
movement: “The civil rights movement had long argued that stereotyping perpetuated racial
subordination by curtailing the opportunities of racial minorities and helping to justify the rigid
racial stratification of American society”); see also infra Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 101–
05 and accompanying text.
ANDERSON, supra note 31, at 144.
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as the goal of racial reform . . . they would be likely to push the theory in
directions that siphon energy away from problems of substantive inequality
and that may be undesirable in their own right.”39 Thus, in order to classify
the anti-stereotyping argument for diversity in one way or another, they must
be read in context and with attention to the value they are meant to uphold.
The utilitarian strand stresses the functional benefits that diversity affords
society, individuals, or the economy.40 Rather than disadvantaged groups,
the utilitarian vision targets beneficiaries with different characteristics that
would contribute to the diversity of the institution. It too can be divided into
two dominant groups of arguments according to the type of good it aims to
promote. The first is pedagogical, and the second is what I call the business case
for diversity.41 The pedagogical strand is focused on the benefits of diversity to
the educational process of all students. It is meant to promote the exchange
of ideas and to foster a stimulating learning environment.42 The business case
for diversity treats diversity as a means to achieve greater economic
prosperity and efficiency at the levels of both society and the individual.43 It
aims to prepare students for success in the diverse contemporary workforce.
An increasingly global economy, it assumes, requires leaders and workers
trained in a diverse environment.44 While distinct from one another, for both
the educational and the market-oriented interests in diversity, race is a proxy
for other elements, such as culture, identity, or ideas that would contribute
to the diversity of the institution. While the two strands were initially
independent rationales, the Article shows that by the time of Fisher, the
pedagogical arguments for diversity were mostly subjected to “greater”
concerns about the market and the economic well-being of graduates. 45
Naturally these arguments are forward-looking and bear little or no
relationship to the history of racial discrimination.
39

40
41
42
43

44
45

Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics,
and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1059 (2009); see also id. (further explaining that “[t]he
unconscious bias discourse, for example, could lead either to the expanded use of diversity training,
or the broad imposition of a norm of instrumentally rational decision making. Neither would
further the cause of racial justice”).
See ROSENFELD, supra note 28, at 94–115.
Another utilitarian interest invoked by the United States in Fisher I is the interest in well-functioning
public institutions. See infra notes 197–205 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II and particularly infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
The business case for diversity is commonly used to describe justifications made by corporations to
engage in diversity efforts for reasons of economic efficiency. I import this term to the realm of
higher education and use it to describe market-based rationales for diversity, focused mainly on
professional training of students and on fostering an effective workforce. For a discussion of the
business case in the corporate context, see generally Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly,
Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71
AM. SOC. REV. 589 (2006).
See infra Part IV.A.1 and particularly infra notes 180–88.
See infra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
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A third dimension of diversity that does not necessarily fit neither to the
egalitarian pole nor to the utilitarian one, is its democratic understanding that
articulates a national ideology of cultural pluralism. Duncan Kennedy
explains that as a culturally pluralist society, we should deliberately structure
institutions in a diverse way. 46 This vision was best articulated by John
Dewey in Democracy and Education: “democracy is more than a form of
government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint
communicated experience.” 47 Diversity, according to this view, is a
manifestation of the democratic way of life. It is a national-democratic
commitment to cultural pluralism and “more numerous and more varied
points of contact” and “a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual
has to respond.”48 This vision of diversity is about pluralism as a democratic
identity; it is an assertion about who we are as a nation. It is thus somewhat
distinct from both egalitarian and utilitarian strands of diversity. However,
both in theory and in the practice that is revealed by the amicus briefs,49 this
deep commitment to democracy often overlaps with egalitarian
commitments. As Amy Gutman explains in her book Democratic Education:
“[t]he principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination simultaneously
support deliberative freedom and communal self-determination,” which are,
according to Gutman, the foundation of democracy.50 “[A]ll citizens,” she
continues, “must be educated so to have a chance to share in self-consciously
shaping the structure of their society.”51
The proposed taxonomy represents a spectrum of meanings, according
to which I classify the values and interests attributed to diversity. The
egalitarian and utilitarian understandings of diversity mark the opposite ends
of the spectrum, and the democratic dimension is external to this spectrum,
but often it is aligned with the egalitarian pole. The three poles of meanings
attributed to diversity—egalitarian, utilitarian, and democratic—are neither
completely distinct in theory nor are they always opposed in practice.52 The
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705,
713–14.
JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION 101 (1916).
Id.
See Part III.A.1 and particularly infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 46 (1987).
Id.
For a theoretical discussion of equality as a utilitarian value, see Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in
1 TANNER LECTURE ON HUMAN VALUES 198–99 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 2011) (1980)
(explaining that “[u]tilitarian equality is the equality that can be derived from the utilitarian concept
of goodness applied to problems of distribution. . . . The utilitarian objective is to maximize the
sum-total of utility irrespective of distribution, but that requires the equality of the marginal utility of
everyone — marginal utility being the incremental utility each person would get from an additional
unit of cake. According to one interpretation, this equality of marginal utility embodies equal
treatment of everyone’s interests” (footnotes omitted) (citing John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin
Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’ Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594 (1975)).
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egalitarian values of diversity were often instrumentalized to serve the
“greater” benefits of maximizing social welfare, and more specifically of the
economic prosperity of both the individual and of society. Furthermore, the
arguments in the amicus briefs are often entangled with one another and in
some cases can be categorized as both utilitarian and egalitarian. Analyzing
numerous briefs, I am often able to distinguish one from the other, relying
on rhetoric and nuanced context. However, like other attempts at discourse
analysis, the proposed sociohistorical account of diversity that follows
acknowledges this complexity and aims to reflect it in the process of
conveying the major transformations in the meaning of diversity that have
occurred over time.
II. BAKKE’S CONSTRAINTS AND THE DIVERSITY FRAMEWORK
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Bakke invalidated the University of
California Davis Medical School’s admissions program that set aside sixteen
places for minority students out of a class of one hundred.53 Disqualifying
Davis’s specific program, Justice Powell, in a plurality opinion, actually
approved the use of race in admissions if necessary to promote a “compelling
state interest.” 54 Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell questioned what
State interests were sufficiently compelling. He admitted that ‘‘[t]he State
certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified
discrimination.’’ 55 However, Justice Powell distinguished between the
legitimate narrow interest in ‘‘redress[ing] the wrongs worked by specific
instances of racial discrimination’’ and the illegitimate goal of ‘‘remedying of
the effects of ‘societal discrimination,’ an amorphous concept of injury that
may be ageless in its reach into the past.”56 The interest in remedying past
discrimination was thus sufficiently compelling only if a university could
identify specific instances of institutional discrimination, but not to rectify
broader social discrimination. In so doing, Justice Powell narrowed the
remedial logic to an extent it was no longer feasible to use in the realm of
higher education.57
Powell instead offered the diversity rationale. ‘‘[T]he attainment of a
diverse student body,” he held, is ‘‘of paramount importance’’ to the

53
54
55
56
57

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 287–320 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 307.
Id.
Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of “Affirmative Action,” 67 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 178–
80 (1979) (asserting that according to Justice Powell, remedial measures can only be based on
legislative findings of past unlawful discrimination).
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University’s mission and ‘‘compelling in the context of a university’s
admissions program.’’58 Turning to the diversity rationale, Justice Powell
relied on Harvard College’s admissions program, as described in an amicus
brief filed by Harvard University, Stanford University, Columbia University,
and the University of Pennsylvania.59 David Oppenheimer recently revealed
that the diversity rationale embraced by Justice Powell in Bakke, was actually
born in an amicus brief submitted by Harvard in a 1974 case that was
dismissed by the court and forgotten.60 Furthermore, even though prior to
Bakke, diversity generally did not serve as a justification for affirmative
action, 61 the roots of Harvard’s commitment to diversity, Oppenheimer
shows, can be traced back to the mid-19th century.62 However, it was only
following Bakke that diversity came to play the lead role in the struggle over
affirmative action. Justice Powell situated diversity as the preeminent
justification for upholding race-conscious admissions policies, confining the
legal debate and the popular discourse to the interest in diversity.
As Pamela Karlan observed, Justice Powell conceptualized diversity as a
pedagogical value in the educational process itself. 63 He focused on the
“educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body,”64
and explained that “the right to select those students who will contribute the
most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas’” is important to the academic freedom
of a university.65 Justice Powell added that “[t]he atmosphere of ‘speculation,
experiment and creation’—so essential to the quality of higher education—is
widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.”66 Justice Powell’s
interest in diversity, as John Jeffries observed, was about improving the
educational experience of all students, rather than helping a specific group.67
Above all, Justice Powell emphasized the pedagogical utility of diversity,
but his interpretation of diversity also encompassed an interest in training

58
59
60
61
62
63

64
65
66
67

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311, 313–14 (plurality opinion).
Justice Powell attached Harvard’s program as an appendix to his opinion. See id. app. at 321–24.
See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 26 at 1, 8 (explaining that the case DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974) was dismissed as moot).
Id. at 1–14.
Id. at 28–34.
Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as Constitutional Litigants, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1624 (2007) (“Justice Powell’s articulation, grounded as it was in earlier cases
involving academic freedom and autonomy, involved a largely intrinsic perspective in the sense that
academic diversity was valuable to the university’s distinctive mission of promoting the robust
exchange of ideas and the advancement of knowledge.”). For a similar reading of Bakke, see Robert
C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59–60 (2003).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 312.
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7.
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leaders and professionals. “[T]he ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse
as this Nation of many peoples,” 68 he stated. This statement could be
attributed to a democratic vision of society, yet Justice Powell did not follow
this direction. Instead, he seemed more interested in the pedagogical and
somewhat market oriented utilitarian interest in diversity, as he asserted that
a “student with a particular background—whether it be ethnic, geographic,
culturally advantaged or disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school
of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its
student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding
their vital service to humanity.” 69 Finally, he underlined that diversity
“encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”70
Justice Powell’s opinion struck a compromise between the forces for and
against affirmative action: it was permitted but restricted. Even though it
was not a majority opinion, it was widely viewed as stating the law and ended
up shaping the conversation over affirmative action. 71 Sanford Levinson
explained how the Court sometimes establishes “law talk,” so that lawyers
and non-lawyers adopt certain arguments and not others, and in Bakke, it was
as if the Court ordered: stop talking about rectification of past social injustice
and start talking about diversity. 72 Critics of diversity draw a complete
contrast between the rejected, backward-looking remedial interests in
affirmative action and the new diversity justification. Paul Mishkin criticized
it on its “exclusive reliance upon the justification of academic diversity,”73
68
69
70
71

72
73

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (explaining that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke
had “served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.
Public and private universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions programs on
Justice Powell’s views on permissible race-conscious policies”); see also Antonin Scalia, Commentary,
The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race”, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 147, 148 (“Justice Powell’s opinion, which we must work with as the law of the land, strikes
me as an excellent compromise between two committees of the American Bar Association on some
insignificant legislative proposal. But it is thoroughly unconvincing as an honest, hard-minded,
reasoned analysis of an important provision of the Constitution.”). Nonetheless, the authority of
Bakke as the law of the land was challenged by the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), in which the majority struck down a raceconscious admissions scheme and asserted that Bakke did not have the legal force that most lawyers
had attributed to it.
See LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 16.
Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 921 (1983). Mishkin drafted the primary brief for the
University in Bakke and argued that racial classifications in the context of affirmative action should
be immune from strict scrutiny.
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and Ronald Dworkin wrote that diversity “does not supply a sound
intellectual foundation for the compromise the public found so attractive.”74
Charles R. Lawrence added that “Powell’s restriction on backward-looking
affirmative action incorporates the big lie into affirmative action doctrine,”
explaining that the focus on diversity and the rejection of egalitarian
rationales pushed us to believe that the nation has overcome its racism.75
Others have claimed that by adopting diversity, affirmative action
disconnected from its moral grounds, and that post-Bakke, minorities have to
rely on the school’s interest in the benefits of diversity.76
Focusing on legal doctrine, these critics describe the dispute over the
justifications for affirmative action in binary and fixed terms: on the one
hand, the lost remedial interest disqualified by Justice Powell, and on the
other hand, the legitimate yet flawed interest in diversity. This Article resists
this binary contrast. Instead, by investigating the briefs and amicus briefs
filed to the Court in subsequent cases challenging higher education
affirmative action, it shows that the meaning of diversity has been subject to
continuous contestation and development. It accounts for the overlooked
conversation between social movements, university officials, and courts that
have shaped the meaning of diversity and the way it was invoked to allow or
restrict affirmative action over time. By doing so, the Article uncovers that
the debate over the competing defenses of affirmative action was actually not
settled by the Court in Bakke or thereafter, but transformed into an internal
and more covert negotiation over the value and significance of diversity.

74

75

76

Ronald Dworkin, The Bakke Decision: Did It Decide Anything?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (Aug. 17, 1978),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1978/08/17/the-bakke-decision-did-it-decide-anything/
(“[T]he argumentative base of his opinion is weak. It does not supply a sound intellectual
foundation for the compromise the public found so attractive. The compromise is appealing
politically, but it does not follow that it reflects any important difference in principle, which is what
a constitutional, as distinct from a political, settlement requires.”).
Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 768
(1997); see also id. at 767 (“I call this ‘the Big Lie.’ Despite overwhelming evidence of continuing
racial discrimination, the Court tells us our nation has overcome its racism.” (footnotes omitted)
(citing Board Hopes to Destroy ‘Intractable’ Racism: U.S. Must Upgrade Its Worst Schools, Open Marketplace,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 15, 1997, at A3; then citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Introduction: Awakening after Bakke, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979)
(“Where past intentional discrimination is not proved, post-Bakke minorities must rely on the
interest of schools in exercising their discretion to admit a small number of minority students whose
numbers will be dictated by the school’s interest in diversity, rather than on either the magnitude
of past racial wrongs or on the minority students’ potential for future achievement.”).
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III. THE DEBATE OVER JUSTIFICATIONS CONTINUES IN GRUTTER AND
GRATZ
Several cases dealing with affirmative action in other spheres were
decided by the Supreme Court in the decades following the Bakke decision,77
yet it was only a quarter of a century later in Gratz v. Bollinger78 and Grutter v.
Bollinger 79 (together the “Michigan cases”) that a challenge to higher
education race-conscious admissions policies reached the Supreme Court.80
The Michigan cases sparked widespread public mobilization for and against
affirmative action and generated numerous amicus briefs. The amicus briefs
touched many aspects of the debate; some did not directly deal with the
justification question, but almost all presented their own interpretation of the
value of diversity. It was the first time that the interest in attaining student
body diversity was debated on a national scale, and therefore is the focus of
this inquiry.
The doctrinal analysis that has dominated the legal and popular
scholarship on this body of law has mostly neglected to address this robust
intervention.81 In contrast, drawing on democratic constitutionalism (also known

77

78
79
80

81

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and imposing “strict scrutiny” on racial
classification imposed by the federal government); Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n,
497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (upholding a federal policy of racial preferences in broadcasting); City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance
that gave preference to minority-owned firms in awarding municipal construction contracts).
539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003).
In 1996, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the University of Texas at Austin’s race-conscious admissions
policy. The University appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which declined
to review the case. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that that
the University had discontinued and was no longer defending the specific admissions policy that
had been at issue in the lawsuit), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033, 1034 (1996).
An exception is an analysis by Brown-Nagin of the mass mobilization surrounding the Michigan
cases that manifested in the form of briefs and amicus briefs. Yet, the focus of her inquiry is not
diversity, but rather the relationship between social movements and juridical law. In doing so, even
Brown-Nagin’s account assumes a binary distinction between diversity and other egalitarian
rationales. Furthermore, the conclusions she draws regarding the tension between social
movements and the law overlooks the evolving meaning of diversity that this article uncovers. See
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1436, 1502 (2005) (“[S]cholars [who conceive of litigation as an instrument of social
reform] minimize the differences between the form and substance of legal processes and concepts,
and the form and purposes of participatory democratic action. In fact, there are profound
differences between most forms and tactics of lawyering and social movement activity.”); see also
David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of
Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553–
54 (2004) (examining the market-based arguments for diversity made by the business sector and its
manifestation in the legal profession).
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as popular constitutionalism) literature,82 the Article focuses exactly on the
interaction between members of the polity and the Court that revealed itself
in the form of an influx of amicus brief submissions. The Article employs the
idea that constitutional understandings are created not just through formal
law-making, but also emerge in interactions between citizens, officials, and
courts. 83 As Larry Kramer recognizes, democratic constitutionalism
scholarship calls for a much-needed step away from the entrenched juriscentric tradition. 84 In order to understand how constitutional norms
develop, we must examine the ongoing engagement of other members of the
polity in the process of constitutional interpretation. 85 Exploring this
interaction between judicial and non-judicial actors in the context of
affirmative action, this Article uncovers the evolving meaning of diversity. It
shows that diversity’s constitutional value was not only defined through
Court opinions,86 but was also transformed and infused with new meanings
82

83
84

85
86

LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 172 (2004) (making a normative claim regarding the rule of popular constitutionalism as
a desirable methodology of constitutional interpretation, and arguing that the Court’s
interpretation should be reflecting the popular will); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000
Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6–10 (2001) (contrasting the notion of judicial
supremacy with the idea of popular constitutionalism); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (proposing a
model of “‘democratic constitutionalism’ to analyze the understandings and practices by which
constitutional rights have historically been established); Post, supra note 63, at 8 (explaining that
constitutional culture “encompasses extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution”);
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto Era, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1325, 1341 (2006) (employing the term “constitutional culture”
to explore how “changes in constitutional understanding emerge from the interaction of citizens
and officials,” and explains that “[c]ollective deliberation helps establish what things mean and why
they matter”). For a review of the literature in the field, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983) (describing how legal
meaning is created, emphasizing that it does not require formal lawmaking); Larry D. Kramer,
Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 960 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, Popular
Constitutionalism] (describing the “new discourse” among legal scholars to interpret the Constitution
to appeal to democratic citizens).
See Siegel, supra note 82, at 1329 (using the term “constitutional culture” to describe how
interactions between citizens and officials produce new constitutional meaning).
Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 82, at 959–60, 965–66. Reviewing this body of
literature, Kramer explains that after Brown, constitutional scholars on both sides of the aisle came
to accept the judiciary as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and started debating over
the question of interpretative methodology. This, he argues, lead the literature to focus on courts
and neglect external influences that shape constitutional law. The scholarly movement of
democratic constitutionalism, Kramer recognizes, is a much-needed step away from this tradition.
Id. at 993.
There are many other theories that embrace the idea of a dynamic “living constitutionalism.”
However, these theories tend to focus on the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, evolving
from one decision to another. Democratic constitutionalism takes the idea of a living constitution
one step further and accounts for the complex ways in which changes in constitutional meaning
take place through the interaction between judicial and extra-judicial actors. For a key theory of
living constitutionalism, see generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
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through the public conversation that revolved around these cases. In what
follows, I uncover this conversation through a textual analysis of the
numerous amicus briefs that were filed by different actors: university officials,
student organizations, public interest groups, veterans, the United States
Government, and others. But first, the facts of the cases.
The University of Michigan (for this section: “U-M” or the “University”)
first adopted race-conscious affirmative admission measures in the 1960s. In
1991 Lee Bollinger, then the president of the University, set in motion steps
to reframe the University’s affirmative measures in terms of diversity so that
they would align with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. 87 At the
undergraduate level preference points were automatically allocated to
applicants of disadvantaged minority groups.88 In contrast, the law school
had in place an individualized holistic review process, under which race was
only one of many factors that may contribute to diversity. 89 In 1997,
plaintiffs represented by the Center for Individual Rights (“CIR”) challenged
the University’s admissions policies both at the undergraduate level and at
the law school.90 The litigation climaxed in two Supreme Court cases, Gratz
and Grutter, which were heard in conjunction and decided in 2003.91
By the time the cases reached the Supreme Court, social mobilization
around them was unprecedented in content and in scope, and produced
seventy-one amicus briefs in support of the university and sixteen in support
of the petitioners.92

A. The Emergence of the Egalitarian Diversity Framework in the Briefs
In Bakke, Justice Powell rejected the goal of remedying the effects of
societal discrimination, while allowing limited use of race in admission
decisions to promote the benefits of diversity to the educational process.93
87

88

89
90
91
92

93

Wendy Parker, The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: Affirmative Action Wins, in EDUCATION L AW STORIES
83, 86–87 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2007) (“In 1991 . . . Dean Lee
Bollinger . . . . appointed a faculty committee to devise an affirmative action policy consistent with
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion. . . . The policy asserted that diversity would improve learning for all
students. . . . To achieve this, the law school sought to enroll ‘a “critical mass” of minority
students.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821, 828 (E.D. Mich.
2001), rev’d 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.) (en banc), aff’d 539 U.S. 306 (2003))).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (“Here, the Law School engages in a highly
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file. . . . Unlike the program at issue in
Gratz . . . the Law School awards no mechanical, predetermined diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race
or ethnicity.” (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72 (2003))).
Id.
Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
For a complete list of amicus briefs submitted in both Grutter and Gratz, see Grutter and Gratz: Amicus
Briefs, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN ADMISSIONS LAWSUITS, https://diversity.umich.edu/
admissions/legal/amicus.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310–12 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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Following the University of Michigan’s defense, the vast majority of the amici
in the two cases seemingly complied with the constraints set by Bakke and did
not openly invoke direct remedial rationales. However, a careful analysis of
the amicus briefs reveals that their interpretation of diversity, in contrast to
Justice Powell’s, was infused with egalitarian interests. Bakke was both
criticized and praised for rejecting the remedial logic and settling the debate
over justifications for affirmative action. Yet, as I demonstrate below, the
debate over the rationales for affirmative action was not over, but rather
transformed into an internal and more covert conversation over the value of
diversity. Bakke closed the main door for egalitarian arguments for
affirmative action. But, by resisting the narrow pedagogical interpretation of
diversity and infusing it with prospective and retrospective egalitarian values,
the proponents of affirmative action opened a window through which the
conversation could continue. In other words, if diversity was introduced as
a form of compromise that allowed affirmative action to continue but
mystified its egalitarian aspirations,94 the Grutter amici curiae reappropriated
it to include remedial as well as distributive egalitarian values.
Many of the amicus briefs filed in the Michigan cases cited Bakke and
encompassed similar utilitarian and pedagogical understandings of diversity,
aspiring to achieve educational benefits and greater goods for society at large.
However, at the same time, the briefs were deeply rooted in the history of
racial discrimination. Distinct not only from Bakke, but also from the
contemporary, market-driven, ahistorical interpretation of diversity, the
Michigan amici viewed diversity as a concept that vindicates a deep concern
for the persistence of racial inequality. Studying the briefs, I identify that the
Michigan amici attributed three types of egalitarian interpretations to
diversity, each focused on a different kind of interest: (1) anti-stereotyping
interests, (2) retrospective remedial interests, and (3) prospective distributive
interests, entangled, in large part, with a democratic vision of society. Of
course, not all of these interests can be found in each brief, and the balance
between the utilitarian defense of diversity and the equality-based defense
varies. Nevertheless, those three strands of egalitarian meaning were present
and salient in the interpretation of diversity at the time of the Michigan cases.
First, I consider the defense of the University of Michigan that served as a
point of reference for many of the amici. Then, with a focus on the academic
amici, I analyze amicus briefs filed in support of the University. Finally, I
supplement this account through analysis of the way diversity is reflected in
the briefs submitted by the petitioners and their supporters.

94

Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1723
(2005) (“Powell allowed universities to admit members of previously disadvantaged groups without
having to state directly that they were remedying past societal discrimination.”).

May 2018]

DIVERSITY GONE WRONG

1167

1. Proponents’ Briefs and the Egalitarian Interests in Diversity
The University of Michigan asked the Court to reaffirm Justice Powell’s
opinion in Bakke. Formally complying with the constraints set in Powell’s
opinion, the University defended its race-conscious affirmative action
policies solely in terms of diversity, cautious not to admit it had any direct
interest in prohibited racial balancing or any remedial motivations.95 This
approach led U-M to recognize the same utilitarian, mostly pedagogical,
benefits of diversity that were emphasized by Justice Powell.96 Even with
such a literal and cautious approach, diversity for U-M was not based solely
on the utilitarian—pedagogical and to a lesser extent market-driven—
rationales that it was in Bakke. For U-M, the interest in diversity was deeply
connected to the history of race discrimination and the persistence of racial
hierarchies. When claiming that Powell’s opinion in Bakke is not only a
binding precedent but also legally “justified,” U-M explained that “[d]espite
noble aspirations and considerable progress, our society remains deeply
troubled by issues of race. Against that backdrop, there are important
educational benefits—for students and for the wider society—associated with
a diverse, racially integrated student body.”97 Similarly, when explaining
that race-conscious measures to promote diversity have “durational limits,”
the University turned to remedial logic and argued that the disparities in
academic preparation that make race-neutral alternatives impossible today
are “rooted in centuries of racial discrimination” and that these disparities
“will eventually be eliminated.”98 The University further claimed that the
goal of diversity:
simply acknowledges the elephant in the room—that despite the recent
advent of formal equality under the law and indisputable progress in race
95

96

97

98

See Brief for Respondents at 12, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter
Brief for Respondents, Grutter] (arguing that Bakke is a “settled precedent,” that it “has been relied
upon by universities for decades . . . and has become an important part of our national culture. It
is also clearly correct”).
Id. at 21–22 (“[P]reparing students for work and citizenship in our diverse society is exceedingly
difficult in racially homogenous classrooms . . . . ‘[R]acially integrated education improves the quality
of education for all children’ . . . and . . . ‘is beneficial to both’ white and minority students.” (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 92-576, at 10 (1971); then quoting S. Rep. No. 92-61, at 7 (1971))). In oral arguments,
the University’s attorney also claimed that “our leaders need to be trained . . . with exposure to the
viewpoints, to the prospectives [sic], to the experiences of individuals from diverse backgrounds.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-214).
Brief for Respondents, Grutter, supra note 95, at 12; see also Brief for Respondents at 25, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents, Gratz] (“Racial and
ethnic diversity is educationally important because, notwithstanding decades of progress, there
remain significant differences in our lives and perceptions that are undeniably linked to the realities
of race. Continuing patterns of residential segregation, for example, mean that ‘the daily events
and experiences that make up most Americans’ lives take place in strikingly homogenous settings.’”
(quoting Joint Appendix at 1968, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1447))).
Brief for Respondents, Grutter, supra note 95, at 33.
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relations (in part because of the growing racial diversity in institutions like
the Law School), America remains both highly segregated by race and
profoundly and constantly aware of its significance in our society.99

The connection between the utilitarian push for diversity and the
egalitarian interpretations of it only deepened in the vast majority of amicus
briefs submitted in support of the University. The coalition of amici was
mainly composed of representatives of university officials, student
organizations, K-12 organizations, civil rights organizations, retired military
generals, and businesses and professional organizations. Academic amici
and other supporters followed the lead of the University of Michigan. Many
of them defended the efforts to promote diversity by pointing to the role and
prerogative of institutions of higher education as they prepare students to be
productive and successful members of society and of the ever-expanding
global workforce. 100 But, even though many recognized the utilitarian—
pedagogical and market-driven—benefits that flow from diversity, their
interpretation of diversity was deeply entangled with notions of racial justice,
equality, and democracy. With the exception of business amici, the
supporters’ interpretation of diversity was rooted in and expressed three
kinds of egalitarian values.
a. Anti-Stereotyping Interests
The first—yet least common—of the egalitarian interests to show up in
the briefs was the interest in breaking down racial stereotypes. A few of the
academic amici claimed that classroom diversity has the potential to
eliminate racial stereotypes and overcome racial divisiveness. Few of the
amici emphasized the advantages of eliminating stereotypical assumptions
both to the educational experience and to the multicultural work

99

100

Id. at 23 (further explaining that “[m]any white Americans underestimate those realities because,
of course, ‘[t]o be born white is to be free from confronting one’s race on a daily, personal,
interaction-by-interaction basis.’ By contrast, ‘[t]o be born black is to know an unchangeable fact
about oneself that matters every day’” (alterations in original) (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A
Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1066 (1991))).
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Columbia Univ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Columbia Brief, Grutter] (“Anyone learns
better in an environment that includes other students who bring a different background and
perspective to the same experience or material. . . . This will provide the ferment and creative
excitement that is itself part of a good education and will prepare them to participate in a world
which promises to be very different from that any of us have experienced.” (quoting Nannerl O.
Keohane, The Mission of the Research University, in THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY IN A TIME OF
DISCONTENT 164 (Jonathan R. Cole et al. eds., 1994))); Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Council on
Educ. & 53 Other Higher Educ. Orgs. in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No.
02-214) [hereinafter ACE Brief, Grutter] (“Diversity is basic to higher education’s main purposes: to
enable students to lead ‘the examined life’; to ready them to maintain the robust democracy in
which we live; and to prepare them to function in the national and global economy.”).
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environment. 101 However, the majority of amici who invoked the antistereotyping interests understood it as an egalitarian value. Some of them
did not find a need to further justify the interest to overcome stereotypes as
they found it a good in itself,102 and for others it was part of the overall fight
against prejudice and bias that lead to discrimination. 103 The American
Federation of Labor, for example, argued that “[a]mong the most clearly
documented educational benefits of the diverse student body . . . is the
reduction of stereotypes and prejudices that lead to discrimination.” 104
Similarly, an amicus brief filed by thirty-eight private colleges and
universities connected anti-stereotyping to discrimination, and to a national
commitment of cultural pluralism:
[i]t is very much a part of our educational mission to expose our students to
differences in race, gender and class . . . to teach them to recognize and
overcome bias, prejudice and discrimination, so that they may understand
that our diversity creates our richness and strength as a nation and as a
people.105

101

102

103

104

105

See, e.g., Brief of Harvard Univ. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Harvard Brief, Grutter] (“Amici’s admissions policies have served
compelling pedagogical interests by contributing to a diverse and inclusive educational experience,
teaching students to view issues from multiple perspectives, and helping to break down prejudices
and stereotypical assumptions. The policies prepare students to work productively in a multiracial
environment after they graduate, and the policies meet the demands of business and the professions
by preparing a generation of public and private leaders for an increasingly pluralistic national and
global economy.”).
See, e.g., Brief of the Am. Educ. Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
20, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“[S]tudent body diversity overwhelmingly leads to positive
outcomes and helps dispel the racial stereotyping that has plagued American society throughout its
history.”); ACE Brief, Grutter, supra note 100, at 25, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“[T]he
educational value of diversity derives not from a false assumption that all members of one race think
alike or that race is a proxy for viewpoint. Rather, diversity enables students to discover the falsity
of such stereotyped, malignant assumptions.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Asian Pac. Am. Legal
Consortium et al. in Support of Respondents at 10 n.4, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (explaining
that diversity is “necessary to avoid precisely the sort of stereotyping that Petitioners decry.”).
See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae the Am. Jewish Comm. et al. in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“Our nation’s history has been marred by centuries of racial and ethnic
prejudices and wrongdoings. As Jews, who have often been the victims of such prejudices, we value
the importance of equality. . . . In that spirit, and in recognition of the value of a diverse campus
community, [the Central Conference of American Rabbis] supports the carefully crafted programs
at issue here.”).
Brief Amicus Curiae of Am. Fed’n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. in Support of Respondents
at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); see also id. (“White, African-American and Hispanic students
schooled with diverse peers are more likely to work in integrated workplaces. Thus, the challenged
admissions policies further the compelling governmental interest in equal employment
opportunity.”).
Brief of Carnegie Mellon Univ. et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14–15, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter CMU Brief, Grutter].
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b. Retrospective Egalitarian Framework: Remedial Interests
More salient was the backward-looking remedial interest in attaining
student body diversity. The most explicit link between remedial interests and
diversity was made in an amicus brief by The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights, who argued that “[t]he Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil
Rights Act provide a compelling remedial interest and inform a diversity
interest.”106 They explained that “given not only the complex and torturous
history of race in this nation, but the contemporary social, political, cultural,
and economic realities it has shaped, race is not simply a matter of skin color
or features.”107 Careful not to explicitly advocate for the rejected separate
remedial defense of affirmative action, many amici interpreted diversity to
include a version of these remedial values. To name but one example of
many,108 the National School Boards Association argued that “[r]acial and
ethnic gaps in educational opportunity and achievement persist across the
nation. Closing these gaps is a compelling national priority that may
necessitate race-conscious policies, including efforts to promote diversity or
prevent racial isolation.”109
Academic amici were even more cautious not to openly invoke explicit
remedial justification for taking race-based measures. Through their
interpretation of diversity, however, they vindicated clear interests in fighting
the persistent effects of past discrimination and situated their current pursuit
of diversity in relation to the history of state-sanctioned discrimination and
the struggle to end it. 110 The United Negro College Fund simply stated:
106
107
108

109

110

Brief of Amici Curiae the Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law et al. in Support of
Respondents at 5 n.3, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
Id. at 28.
For non-academic briefs, see, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae Black Women Lawyers Ass’n of Greater
Chi., Inc., in Support of Respondents at 29, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“[W]hen will this
use of race to achieve diversity end? . . . We will know that we have reached that point when a child
born black has the same opportunity in America as a child born white in America. We will have
reached that day when research reflects that there is no economic disparity in America based upon
race for individuals similarly situated.”); Brief Amici Curiae of Veterans of the S. Civil Rights
Movement & Family Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists in Support of Respondents at 2,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“[E]fforts to promote . . . diversity . . . [are] needed so America
can continue its progress toward becoming a society in which all have a fair opportunity to
participate.” (alteration in original)).
Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n et al. in Support of Respondents at 20, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (No. 02-241) (footnotes omitted) (citing Dear Colleague Letter from Secretary Richard Riley,
U.S. Department of Education, (Jan. 19, 2001); then citing No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20
U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2002); and then citing Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d
738, 742–53 (2d Cir. 2000)).
See, e.g., Brief of Howard Univ. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 39–40, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“The fact that the University gives considerable weight to race and ethnicity
in the admissions process in order to achieve diversity and ameliorate the effects of discrimination
is both necessary, if it is to be a real factor, and unsurprising given the profound and
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“[t]he racial exclusion, segregation, and discrimination that, for centuries,
permeated all aspects of the Nation’s educational system . . . are significant
to understanding the compelling nature of the governmental interest in
admitting a diverse student body and the benefits to both individuals and
society of ensuring educational opportunity for all . . . .”111
Similarly, Amherst and twenty-seven fellow prestigious colleges
emphasized the close relationship between their contemporary efforts to
promote student diversity and “the commitment to broadly include students
from groups which had been systematically disadvantaged and effectively
excluded . . . .” The Colleges claimed that “[t]he interest in educating
students from all reaches of American society . . . has deep roots, and cannot
be dismissed as late-twentieth century social engineering.”112 After describing
their long history of employing diversity efforts, a group of elite universities,
including Harvard, Yale, and Brown, stated that it was against this “historical
backdrop that selective universities ultimately developed their admissions
policies with respect to African-Americans and other minority groups that
have been subject to targeted exclusion from many of the benefits of American
life.”113 The academic coalition not only tied their interest in diversity to the
saliency of past discrimination, but also directly pointed to the remedial
potential of attaining diversity. As the American Law Deans Association
explained:
“[r]acial diversity eliminates racial identifiability; racial
identifiability is important evidence of segregation and discrimination . . . .”114
The Student Intervenors Coalition115 defended U-M’s policy by arguing

111
112
113
114
115

intergenerational effects of two hundred and fifty years of slavery, followed by a century of Jim
Crow, followed by slow progress in the face of continuing discrimination.”); Harvard Brief, Grutter,
supra note 101, at 29 (“[T]he interest in a racially diverse student body might gradually become
decoupled from policies that give favorable consideration to minority race and ethnicity.”). Even
in briefs that followed Justice Powell’s opinion more rigidly or focused not on diversity itself but on
the deference that should be given to the university, the unique and unparalleled commitment to
racial and ethnic representation, to the representation of “minority groups” or “disadvantaged
groups,” was exceptional. See, e.g., Columbia Brief, Grutter, supra note 100, at 4 (“[O]ne factor
amongst the multitude it considers in its admissions process should be the race and ethnic
background of otherwise underrepresented minorities.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Mass. Inst. of Tech.
et al. in Support of Respondents at 24, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“We must not pretend
that racial discrimination against minorities is no longer an issue in the United States.”).
Brief for the United Negro Coll. Fund & Kappa Alpha Psi as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
Brief of Amherst et al. Amici Curiae, Supporting Respondents at 19, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02241).
Harvard Brief, Grutter, supra note 101, at 10.
Brief of Am. Law Deans Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (No. 02-241).
Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter
Kimberly James Brief, Grutter] (filed on behalf of three groups: United for Equality and Affirmative
Action (“UEAA”), Law Students for Affirmative Action (“LSAA”), and the Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action and Integration and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (“BAMN”)).
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that traditional admission criteria were discriminatory, and that affirmative
action was required “to undo some portion of the odious impact that its two
main admissions criteria would otherwise have on the fairness of its
admissions process as well as the diversity of its student body.”116 Promoting
this argument, it treated diversity as a defective but necessary compromise
that had to be upheld.117 The Student Coalition recognized that diversity
“obscured affirmative action’s fundamental nature as a means of achieving
integration and equality,”118 but at the same time realized that it is the only
way the Court “can sanction the right of universities to continue equalizing
educational opportunity, can make universities more accountable to the
public, and can provide much needed protection of the gains towards
integration this society has made.”119 The Student Coalition, as well as other
student intervenors, embraced a remedial interpretation of diversity, while
accepting that such compromise might narrow the historical aspiration to
rectifying the wrongs of the past. By acknowledging the indirect and limited
nature of the diversity compromise and yet recognizing its potential to
eliminate racial discrimination, they charged the diversity interest with
remedial values.120
c.

Prospective Egalitarian Framework: Distributive Interests and the
Democratic Understanding of Diversity

The predominance of forward-looking interests in diversity in the briefs
filed in the Michigan cases is not surprising. In Bakke, diversity was framed
as a future-oriented interest,121 and this was considered to be a major element
of its persuasive force.122 It is only natural that the briefs trying to convince
the Court to affirm Bakke have followed this line. However, it is surprising
116
117

118
119
120

121
122

Id. at 19.
Id. at 17 (“To most Americans, uniting the nation on the basis of Justice Powell’s conception of
diversity merged easily with the aspirations inspired by Brown to unite the nation on the basis of
integration. . . . [P]rogress toward an integrated nation could continue, slowed down, on the
indirect paths Justice Powell had sanctioned even if not on the direct road to freedom. Even with
all its limitations, . . . Justice Powell’s decision has met the test of history.”).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30–31.
See Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of a Comm. of Concerned Black Graduates of ABA Accredited
Law Schs.: Vicky L. Beasley et al. in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02241) (“Programs that promote diversity serve a compelling state interest because they correct the
systematic ways in which the traditional admissions criteria afford racial preferences . . . .”); see also
Brief on Behalf of Hillary Browne et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“Diversity is a compelling governmental interest because it furthers the
goal of societal integration articulated in Brown and provides students who lived in racial isolation
prior to entering college with the opportunity to interact with students of different races.”).
See supra Part II and particularly supra notes 63–69.
See LEVINSON, supra note 5 (suggesting that diversity should be valued for its ability to transform the
future, rather than as a way to remedy the past).
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that while for Justice Powell most of these forward-looking interests in
diversity were utilitarian and emphasized its pedagogical benefits, the
Michigan amici presented an additional forward-looking interpretation, an
egalitarian one. For the Michigan amici, the utilitarian interests were
present, but not exclusive; instead, they were strongly tied to the distributive
value of diversity and its potential to promote equal citizenship and a
pluralistic vision of American democracy. For instance, the Harvard brief
stated that:
[H]ighly selective universities have long defined as one of their central
missions the training of the nation’s business, government, academic, and
professional leaders. By creating a broadly diverse class, amici’s admissions
policies help to assure that their graduates are well prepared to succeed in
an increasingly complex and multi-racial society. The policies also make
certain that no racial or ethnic group is excluded from that vital
process[,] . . . ensuring that minorities are not excluded from the professions
and positions of future leadership.123

This excerpt shows that, for elite universities at the time of the Michigan
cases, utilitarian interests in diversity were entangled with distributive values—
concerned with just distribution of opportunity and status, as well as with
democratic values—committed to cultural pluralism. A group of state
universities have also emphasized the distributive value of diversity:
“‘ensur[ing] that the full range of opportunities [it provides] are accessible to
all segments of an increasingly diverse society’ and ‘[e]nhancing
opportunities for enrolling, retaining, and graduating students from
underrepresented groups.’”124 These arguments can also be associated with
the principle of anti-subordination, as they reflect an interest in making sure
that no group is systematically excluded from positions of civic leadership.125
For other academic amici, those distributive benefits were part of a democratic
vision of diversity. “By breaking down barriers,” the American Council on
123

124
125

Harvard Brief, Grutter, supra note 101, at 3, 12 (emphasis added); see also CMU Brief, Grutter, supra note
105, at 7 (“Equal opportunity for citizens of all races does not require indifference to race; instead, it
requires appreciation and mutual respect that can only be achieved through productive and robust
interaction.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. in Support of Appellants’ Appeal for Reversal
of the District Court Order at 19–20, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 011447) [hereinafter Law School Deans Brief, Grutter] (“[E]ven under the Court’s strict scrutiny
analysis, judges could distinguish between a race-conscious ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a raceconscious ‘welcome mat.’” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995))).
Brief of the Univ. of Pittsburgh et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
For a discussion of the antisubordination and anticlassification principles, and their manifestation
in equal protection jurisprudence, see Siegel, supra note 34, at 1472–73, explaining that the
anticlassification principle “embraces a particular conception of equality, one that is committed to
individuals rather than to groups,” and prohibits all identity-based classifications, regardless of their
goal. By contrast, the antisubordination principle is based on “the conviction that it is wrong for
the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed
groups.” Id.
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Education (“ACE”) argued, “diversity advances a chief purpose of higher
education . . . because ‘[a] democracy is more than a form of government; it
is primarily a mode of associated living.’” 126 Diversity, they added, is
necessary “to prepare students for citizenship. An educated citizenry is the
predicate of a thriving democracy.”127 Finally, the ACE brief asserts that
“[t]he Founders saw higher education as essential to train the nation’s leaders
who, John Adams held, should be recruited not from among ‘the rich or the
poor, the highborn or the low-born, the industrious or the idle; but all those
who have received a liberal education.’”128 This brief and others articulated
a national commitment to cultural pluralism as the democratic way of life.129
The democratic meaning attributed to diversity could have been categorized
as an independent interpretation of diversity, but a close reading reveals that
it actually entailed a vision of equal citizenship. According to this vision,
students are “democratic equals” 130 and no group is excluded from
educational opportunities and future leadership positions.131
The distributive and democratic interests in diversity were dominant not
only among academic amici, but also among other groups of the Michigan
amici. Non-academic amici, such as governmental officials and civil rights
organizations, also considered diversity a tool to “create a pipeline of racially
diverse leaders” and foster “the fuller participation of previously dispossessed
segments of our society.”132 A group of congressmen argued the benefits of
diversity include “the enhanced economic, social and political participation
of racial minorities” and explained “[i]n a democratic system, a group of
126
127
128
129

130

131

132

ACE Brief, Grutter, supra note 100, at 20–21 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
101 (1916)).
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 21 (quoting John Adams, in THE JOHN ADAMS PAPERS 182 (Frank Donovan ed., 1965)).
See e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Sch. of Law of the Univ. of N.C. Supporting Respondent at 7,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“The State of North Carolina knows, in short, that its future
statewide leadership cohort should be, and inevitably will be, racially and ethnically diverse.”).
Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. in Support of Respondents at 10, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(No. 02-241) (“[I]ntegrated education advantages all students in a distinctive way, by bringing rich
and poor, black and white, urban and rural, together to teach and learn from each other as democratic
equals.” (emphasis added)).
Harvard Brief, Grutter, supra note 101, at 3–4 (arguing that it is “legitimate for universities to concern
themselves with ‘ensur[ing] that [they] are open to all individuals and that student bodies are
educationally diverse and broadly representative of the public.’” (quoting Brief of the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02516))); see also Brief of Am. Law Deans Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“Failure to educate a leadership class among disadvantaged
minority populations would be a permanent threat to equality and social stability.”).
Brief for the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. & the ACLU as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 6, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); see also Brief of King Cty. Bar Ass’n as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10–11, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (“The Coalition’s
mission is to increase ethnic diversity in the legal profession so that our courtrooms and law offices
better reflect the communities they serve.”).
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citizens must be able to obtain their government’s assistance in preserving
access to the ‘transactions and endeavors that constitute life in a free
society.’”133 Another group of congressmen tied diversity to the ideal of equal
representation and explained that “[t]he Constitution also breathes life into
this principle of equality and the importance of diversity in its framework for
a democratic system of government. Our country was founded on the
principles of democracy and representational government.”134 While there is
no doubt that these interests have utilitarian benefits, the Michigan amici
focused on ideals of equal participation and representation, which they valued
independently, regardless of their social function and potential benefits.
Finally, in a very influential brief by a group of retired military officers, it
was claimed that “a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated
and trained to command our nation’s racially diverse enlisted ranks is
essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide
national security.”135 First, as Douglas Laycock argues, it is important to
notice that this brief argues not that military officers need to be educated in
a diverse classroom, but the much broader and seemingly democratic claim
that the officer corps in itself needs to be racially diverse.136 This brief is hard
to classify. On the one hand, it makes functional claims for the necessity of
diversity for the military effectiveness and ability to fight. These could be
classified as utilitarian, but they seem to also entail a vision about a military
in a democratic society. At the very least, as the brief itself notes, an
“indivisible link existed between military efficiency and equal
opportunity.”137 Diversity, it asserted, is “critical to both the operational
efficiency of the military and to the creation of the more just and equal
environment.”138 For the retired generals, the utilitarian benefits of diversity
were deeply connected to its egalitarian value.
The only amicus briefs not dominated by the egalitarian interpretations
of diversity were those of the business amici. For them, diversity was a
business interest. Classroom diversity, they argued, is necessary for
effectively training students for the increasingly heterogeneous and global
workforce.139 Educational diversity, they added, is a step in promoting the
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Brief of John Conyers, Jr., Member of Congress et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 4, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
Brief of Representative Richard A. Gephardt et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241.)
Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 5, 10–13, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter The Military Brief].
Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic Excellence, and Future
Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1772 (2004).
The Military Brief, supra note 135, at 11.
Id. at 17.
Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading Am. Buss. in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
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business interest in a workforce that reflects the nation’s diversity.140 But
even these naturally utilitarian amici, in some briefs, recognized the
persistency of past and present racial discrimination and attributed
significance to the promotion of diversity and inclusion of racial and ethnic
minorities.141
Thus, although some amici emphasized utilitarian interests, the
dominant interpretation of diversity at the time of the Michigan cases
vindicated egalitarian values.
The amici supporting race-conscious
affirmative action understood diversity to be deeply connected to the struggle
for racial equality: fighting racial stereotypes, remedying the effects of past
discrimination, and working for a more just distribution of civic
opportunities.
2. Opponents’ Briefs Mirror the Egalitarian Interpretation
For the plaintiffs and their public interest counsel—the Center for
Individual Rights (“CIR”)—as well as for amici opponents of affirmative
action, the question of whether diversity is a compelling interest was still
open.142 They argued that “diversity is simply too indefinite, ill-defined, and
lacking in objective, ascertainable standards to be fitted to narrowly-tailored
measures.” 143 However, some of the opponents’ amicus briefs either
accepted diversity as a compelling interest or were willing to accept it for
purposes of the discussion.144 In so doing, these briefs serve as a mirror to

140

141

142
143
144

(No. 02-241) [hereinafter 65 Businesses Brief, Grutter] (“Because our population is diverse, and
because of the increasingly global reach of American business, the skills and training needed to
succeed in business today demand exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and
viewpoints.”); Brief of Gen. Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter General Motors Brief, Grutter] (“[O]nly a well educated,
diverse work force, . . . can maintain America’s competitiveness in the increasingly diverse and
interconnected world economy.”).
See Brief of Amici Curiae Media Cos. in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No.
02-241) (“From a purely business perspective, a diverse workforce is essential to amici’s success. . . .
The communities served by the media increasingly reflect multiple racial and ethnic backgrounds.
Individuals in these communities are likely to choose a broadcast station or newspaper where the
programming reflects the diversity of the community.”).
See 65 Businesses Brief, Grutter, supra note 139, at 8 (“Whatever methodology is employed to select
those who will be afforded the opportunity to obtain the best education and training available in
America today, that methodology must operate in such a way that students of all races, cultures
and ethnic backgrounds are in fact meaningfully included.”); see also General Motors Brief, Grutter,
supra note 139, at 8–9 (“[A]n individual can only experience racial or ethnic discrimination based on
his or her race or ethnicity; and endeavoring to include in a law school class individuals who have
actually experienced the kind of racial or ethnic discrimination being discussed in class requires
consideration of race in admissions.”).
Brief for the Petitioner at 34, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (arguing that diversity as an
educational benefit is distinct and inapplicable to the Court’s compelling interest analysis).
Id. at 17.
See, e.g., Brief of the State of Fla. & the Honorable John Ellis “Jeb” Bush, Governor, as Amici Curiae
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claims made by the University of Michigan and its supporters. They raised
questions regarding the value of diversity and challenged the claim that the
diversity rationale is distinct from remedial motives.145
The Bush Administration submitted an amicus brief objecting to the
University’s use of race in its admissions programs. The Administration
acknowledged the legitimacy of diversity as a compelling interest, yet argued
that there are ample race-neutral alternatives to achieve it.146 The interest
in diversity it identified was thoroughly connected to ideals of equality. The
brief opened with the following statement: “[e]nsuring that public
institutions, especially educational institutions, are open and accessible to a
broad and diverse array of individuals, including individuals of all races and
ethnicities, is an important and entirely legitimate government objective,”
and questioned if the chosen policies are really necessary “to ensure that
minorities have access to and are represented in institutions of higher
learning.”147 It appears that, to the United States government, diversity was
first and foremost an interest in equal access and participation of previously
excluded groups. Other opposition amici made similar claims and reiterated
the connections between diversity and equality. 148 Thus, despite their
objection to race-conscious affirmative action, several opponents attributed
egalitarian values to diversity. In part, these are surely strategic claims that
aim to blur the distinctiveness of diversity and undermine its legitimacy, yet
they also reflect that the interest in diversity was, at the time, deeply
connected to ideals of equality.

B. Justice O’Connor’s Opinion: Diversity, Democracy, and Equal Opportunity
The Michigan cases affirmed the use of race in higher education
admissions policies and were celebrated by proponents of affirmative
action.149 Even though the Court invalidated the undergraduate admissions

145

146

147
148

149

in Support of Petitioners at 20, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Florida Brief, Grutter]
(“Even assuming that the diversity that the University of Michigan is attempting to achieve
constitutes a compelling state interest, its race-conscious admissions policies are not narrowly
tailored to accomplish that interest.”).
Id. at 21–22 (“The justification for diversity based solely upon a public policy argument, without a
showing that it is necessary to correct past discrimination, is insufficient to meet the compelling
interest requirements.” (emphasis altered)).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13–18, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(No. 02-241) [hereinafter United States Brief, Grutter] (arguing that “[n]o segment of society should
be denied an opportunity to obtain access to government services and public institutions,” but
offering a list of race-neutral alternatives to achieving diversity).
Id. at 8, 19.
See, e.g., Florida Brief, Grutter, supra note 144, at 2 (“Florida has provided alternative but race-neutral
means of admission to those students who are striving for excellence, but who may have been
disadvantaged by a lack of educational opportunities.”).
See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Affirmative Action; Justices Back Affirmative Action by 5 to 4, but
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policy in Gratz,150 in both cases diversity was found to be a compelling state
interest that can justify some uses of race classifications. In Gratz, the majority
of the Court decided that the University’s admissions policy was not narrowly
tailored to achieve educational diversity, but that for the reasons set forth in
Grutter, diversity is a compelling state interest.151 In Grutter, the Court upheld
the law school’s holistic admissions policy and affirmed that it has “a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.”152
The interpretative framework set by the amici in the Michigan cases was
reflected in the Court’s opinion in Grutter, as the Court appears to have
identified at least three goals that diversity promotes:
The first goal is the utilitarian pedagogical and market-driven objective
of preparing students for the workforce. Citing the amicus brief filed by the
American Educational Research Association, the Court noted that,
“diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
professionals.’” 153 The “skills needed in today’s increasingly global
marketplace,” the Court emphasized, “can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”154 This
can clearly be identified as a forward-looking utilitarian interest in the
professional success of all students and the wellbeing of society at large.
Second, the Court acknowledged anti-stereotyping benefits of diversity and
explained that it “promotes ‘cross-racial understanding’” and helps to “break
down racial stereotypes,”155 but for Justice O’Connor, these benefits were
“important and laudable,” not only in themselves, but also because
“‘classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting’ when the students have ‘the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds.’”156 It is unclear if such benefits can independently

150

151
152
153
154
155
156

Wider Vote Bans a Racial Point System, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/
06/24/us/supreme-court-affirmative-action-justices-back-affirmative-action-5-4-but-wider.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2018) (“The rulings today came as an enormous relief to the civil rights
community, as well as to public and private colleges and universities around the country, dozens of
which had joined briefs supporting Michigan.”).
In Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003), by a 6–3 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, held that the University’s policy “which automatically distributes 20
points . . . needed to guarantee admissions, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’
applica[tion], solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational
diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.”
Id. at 268, 275; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
Id. at 330 (quoting Brief of the Am. Educ. Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 246a, 244a, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)).
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justify the use of race-based measures, but it is apparent that for the Grutter
Court, race was more than just another element of difference that could
contribute to the utilitarian benefits of diversity.
The third and most dominant objective the Court attributes to diversity is
the prospective value in sustaining the American democracy. 157 This
conception of democracy was committed to cultural pluralism as a national
ideology, but it was also inseparably entangled with an egalitarian vision of
society and its institutions. Diversity, the Court observed, is necessary to
sustain “our political and cultural heritage,” 158 because “[e]ffective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of
our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be
realized.” 159 More practically, in explaining the interest in diversity, the
Court referred to the United States amicus brief and asserted that
“[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments of
American society, including people of all races and ethnicities, represents a
paramount government objective.”160 Furthermore, the Court charged that
the interest in diversity is the interest in ensuring that the “path to leadership”
is “visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity.”161 “All members of our heterogeneous society,” the Court stated,
“must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational
institutions that provide this training,” which is necessary in order to cultivate
leaders with “legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”162
It seems that Grutter establishes equal opportunity as a central justification
for diversity, but its focus on legitimacy creates some ambiguity. It is possible
that legitimacy can be assured without actual diversity, but with the mere
appearance of openness. But it seems more plausible to infer that Grutter
asserts an interest in the openness of institutions of civil participation as an
independent and democratic social good advanced by diversity. 163 As
Pamela Karlan recognized—by relying on amicus briefs that explicitly
invoke the rejected “interest in reducing the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities,” “Grutter marks a significant expansion of the concept
157
158
159
160
161
162

163

Post, supra note 63, at 60–61.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
Id. at 331–32 (quoting United States Brief, Grutter, supra note 146, at 13).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 332. In other parts of the opinion, Justice O’Connor acknowledges the wrongs of past
discrimination without recognizing the interest in remedying past discrimination. See, e.g., id. at
337–38 (“With respect to the use of race itself, all underrepresented minority students admitted by
the Law School have been deemed qualified. By virtue of our Nation’s struggle with racial
inequality, such students are both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law
School’s mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those
experiences.”).
For an interesting discussion, see Post, supra note 63, at 60–61.
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of diversity as a compelling interest.”164 Similarly, Reva Siegel identified that
“Grutter transforms the diversity rationale in the course of adopting it,
expanding the concept of diversity so that it explicitly embraces
antisubordination values . . . [by which] no group is excluded from participating
in public life and thus relegated to an outsider, or second-class status . . . .”165
Influenced, so it appears, by the prospective egalitarian interpretations
suggested in the amicus briefs, the Grutter Court considered diversity to be an
interest in ensuring that no group is systematically excluded from higher
education and from positions of influence in society. The Court’s interest in
diversity was thus not a merely utilitarian interest in the benefits of civic
participation, training leaders, and maintaining legitimacy, but an interest in
equal opportunity to participate and to lead—an interest in equal citizenship.166
In other words, for the Grutter Court, diversity was a forward-looking
democratic value in the equal distribution of educational opportunities. Jack
Greenberg argues that the Court’s eye was “on the condition of society and
what affirmative action can do to help fix it, not what caused the
condition.” 167 But did it also embody the backward-looking remedial
interpretation of diversity that was eminent in the amicus briefs? The answer
to that is less clear, but appears to be positive in two ways. First, by
embracing an antisubordination perspective and emphasizing the role of
higher education in promoting the “[e]ffective participation by members of
all racial and ethnic groups,” 168 the Court seems to have recognized the
persistence of racial inequality, as well as the existing asymmetry between
opportunities available to minority groups and those available for the
majority groups, and the need to fight it. Second, by insisting on the
temporality of the need to take diversity efforts and expecting that “25 years
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today,”169 the Court seemed to vindicate some form of
remedial perspective. Whatever is wrong with the current situation of
students’ attainment will be fixed in time by taking measures to diversify the
schools. Thus, the time-limitation requirement, Robert Post explains, only
makes sense if the justification for diversity is quasi-remedial.170 Grutter, then,
contains this tension between a strong prospective orientation, and

164

165
166

167
168
169
170

See Karlan, supra note 63, at 1626 (referring to Justice O’Connor’s strong reliance on arguments
presented by amicus briefs that explicitly adopted some of the egalitarian justifications for
affirmative action previously rejected by Justice Powell in Bakke).
See Siegel, supra note 34, at 1538–39.
For a similar interpretation of Grutter, see Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown and Grutter: A Play in Three
Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1719 (2005) (“[T]he Court argues that affirmative action is
necessary for individuals to secure equal opportunity. . . .”).
Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1621 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 , 332 (2003).
Id. at 343.
Post, supra note 63, at 67 n.306.
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recognition of the unique disadvantage of racial minorities in entering
institutions of higher education.
Despite this strong egalitarian interpretation of diversity set forth by the
Grutter Court, in the following years the conversation about diversity
continued and its meaning was narrowed dramatically to utilitarian values,
primarily concerned with educational and economic benefits.
IV. DIVERSITY’S TRANSFORMATION IN FISHER I
The admissions policy at the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”) is an
outcome of years of litigation. After UT’s race-conscious admissions policy
was banned in 1996,171 the Texas legislature adopted the “top ten percent
plan.” Under this program, the top ten percent of the graduating classes of
each high school in the state were automatically admitted to UT. Taking
into account the segregation in the public school system, this plan was meant
to promote racial and ethnic diversity.172 Following the Grutter decision, UT
implemented an additional individualistic admissions plan, under which the
university considered, among many other factors, the race of applicants not
admitted through the percentage plan in order to increase diversity.173 In
Fisher I, the Petitioner argued that UT’s consideration of race in reviewing
individual applicants was unconstitutional because the university had a raceneutral alternative.174 The Fifth Circuit upheld the policy.175

A. The Takeover of Utilitarian Diversity in the Briefs
Fewer than ten years separated the Michigan cases from the Fisher
litigation, but the meaning of diversity seems to have changed immensely
during that time. Part III of this Article demonstrates that the Grutter Court
adopted a more robust interpretation of diversity that included egalitarian
perspectives. But the Fisher amici—comprised of seventy-three amici curiae
in support of UT and seventeen in support of the Petitioner—turned in a
different direction.176 Closely analyzing these briefs, I find that the amici in
Fisher I mostly pursued the business case for diversity.
For the amici in Fisher I, diversity was a utilitarian value, mostly divorced
from ideals of equality and racial justice. And thus, in the 2010s, diversity
was no longer interconnected with remedial and distributive ideals, but
171
172
173
174
175
176

Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013).
Id.
Brief for Petitioner at 20–21, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
For a complete list of amicus briefs submitted in both cases, see Fisher vs. UT Austin: U.S. Supreme
Court (2011), UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS,
https://legal.utexas.edu/scotus-2011 (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
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instead its interpretation reflected pedagogical and mostly economic utility,
such as preparing students to succeed in a heterogeneous society and building
a more effective workforce. The egalitarian and democratic aspects of
diversity did not disappear completely, but they were scarcer and mostly
subjugated to utilitarian goals, such as professional training or the economic
wellbeing of society. The interest in ensuring that “the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals,” as articulated by Justice
O’Connor in Grutter,177 was, naturally, often cited in the briefs. However,
these references were mostly instrumentalized for promoting external
interests, such as the unity of society or productivity of the market rather than
equality in itself.
1. Proponents’ Briefs and the Utilitarian Interests in Diversity
In its brief, UT declared that the objectives of the program are the
educational benefits flowing from a diverse student body. This kind of
diversity, UT made clear, is composed not just of race but of a far broader
array of qualifications and characteristics, “including geographic diversity,
socioeconomic diversity, cultural diversity, and so on.”178 UT stated that
diversity is in the “[n]ation’s paramount interest in educating its future
leaders in an environment that best prepares them for the society and
workforce they will encounter.”179 The interest in diversity, the University
explained, “includes an ‘academic environment’ in which there is ‘a robust
exchange of ideas, exposure to differing cultures, preparation for the
challenges of an increasingly diverse workforce, and acquisition of
competencies required of future leaders.’”180 While these arguments seem to
have a democratic dimension committed to cultural pluralism, it is important
to notice that these are not normative arguments about who should our
leaders be or how diverse should the society be, but functional arguments
concerned with the utilitarian interest of training students in an environment
that best prepares them for life in the diverse society and workforce. UT’s
brief was not devoid of references to equality,181 but these notions were scarce
and mostly subject to utilitarian benefits. For example, when asked to
explain why the policy favors African-Americans and Hispanics, UT argued
that “[b]y virtue of our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality,” such
students are likely to have experiences of particular importance. 182 UT
177
178
179
180
181
182

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
Brief for Respondents at 25, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 39 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 40 (mentioning for the first and last time UT’s responsibility “in ensuring that ‘the path to
leadership be visibly open . . . .’” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. 332)).
Id. at 44 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338) (arguing that UT’s diversity policies comply with Supreme
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added that “[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or having particular
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s
own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own,
in which race unfortunately still matters.”183 Thus, race and the struggle for
equality were a kind of commodity for UT; they mattered, but as another
element of identity that comprises diversity for the purpose of promoting
utilitarian benefits.
The majority of academic amici was even less (and some hardly at all)
interested in the egalitarian interpretation of diversity, as they were focused
on its utilitarian benefits. Diversity, for these amici, was composed of both
pedagogical and market-driven interests, yet it seems that the educational
mission itself has changed and became more focused on professional training
rather than on the educational process in itself. State universities, the Ivy
League schools, 37 liberal arts colleges, and other universities argued that
their goal—as institutions of higher education—is to prepare the leaders of
tomorrow for the ever-growing multicultural world, and that classroom
diversity is necessary in achieving this task.184 The American Council on
Education, for example, claimed that “a purpose of higher education is to
equip professionals and business leaders to interact with diverse customers,
clients, co-workers, and business partners,”185 and that this need to prepare
students for “[t]he ever-thickening web of economic, political, and social ties

183
184

185

Court precedent).
Id. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333).
See, e.g., Amherst Brief, Fisher I, supra note 2, at 29 (“The inescapable realities of increased diversity
in the country and growing global interconnectedness have led amici colleges to incorporate the
understanding of diversity in many fields of study. Put simply, students need to learn how to work
with, market to, and buy from people from diverse backgrounds and cultures.”); Brief of Brown
University et al. in Support of Respondents at 6, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345)
[hereinafter Brown Brief, Fisher I] (“Diversity encourages students to question their assumptions, to
understand that wisdom and contributions to society may be found where not expected, and to gain
an appreciation of the complexity of the modern world. In these ways, diversity bolsters the unique
role of higher education in ‘preparing students for work and citizenship’ and training ‘our Nation’s
leaders’ for success in a heterogeneous society.” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331, 332)); Brief Amici
Curiae of Fordham Univ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 5, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11345) (quoting the University of San Francisco’s “mission . . . to advance a ‘diversity of perspectives,
experiences and traditions as essential components of a quality education in our global context.’”);
Brief of Leading Public Research Univs. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14,
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Brief for Leading Public Research Univs., Fisher
I] (quoting the University of Kansas’ “vision of diversity” for a learning environment which
“provides our students valuable experiences that will help them prosper after graduation in an
increasingly global and multicultural world.”); Brief for the Howard Univ. Sch. of Law Civil Rights
Clinic as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345)
(“[D]iversity provides students a wider range of perspectives as to the material they study in their
classes and better prepares them for the world they will encounter upon graduation.”).
Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Educ. and 39 Other Higher Educ. Orgs. in Support
of Respondents at 10, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) [hereinafter ACE Brief, Fisher I].
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between nations” makes diversity even more compelling today. 186
Moreover, Dean Martha Minow of Harvard Law School and Dean Robert
Post of Yale Law School focused on the pedagogical value of diversity and
the atmosphere of speculation it cultivates, as well as its market-oriented
benefits. They emphasized the importance of diversity for “preparing
students for the practice of law in today’s increasingly globalized and
heterogeneous economic world.”187 Diversity, it was explained, benefits not
only individuals but “society as well, for it fosters the development of citizens
and leaders who are creative, collaborative, and able to navigate deftly in
dynamic, diverse environments.”188 These examples—invoking conceptions
of citizenship and leadership—seem to entail pluralistic and democratic
interests in diversity. However, as we can see, they are largely
instrumentalized to achieve other social functions, rather than embody any
egalitarian ideal of remedy or distribution. Furthermore, many academic
amici added lengthy explanations—in part grounded in social science—
about how all “students benefit from a robust exchange of ideas and exposure
to different cultures,”189 emphasizing the benefits of diversity to the majority
group.
Some universities tried to explicitly distance their interest in diversity
from remedial aspirations and positioned their efforts as completely
utilitarian. A brief submitted by a number of elite universities, including
Stanford, Harvard, and Yale, explained:
The compelling governmental interest in diversity in higher education is
quite different from remedying generalized discrimination. The issue here
is whether, in assessing diversity, a university may take into account the need
(a) to foster conditions for providing the most stimulating learning
environment possible and (b) to train effectively citizens and leaders for a
heterogeneous society.190

Citing Grutter, some academic amici did call for the removal of barriers
and opening pathways to leadership, but this democratic objective was
mostly meant to serve superior pedagogical or economic utilities, such as

186
187

188
189

190

Id. at 8.
Brief of Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha Minow as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 8, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Brief of Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha
Minow, Fisher I]; see also Brief for the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n at 3, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11345) (“To remain effective the legal profession must reflect the changing demographics of the
United States’ population.” (emphasis altered)).
Brown Brief, Fisher I, supra note 184, at 9.
See, e.g., Brief of Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha Minow, Fisher I, supra note 187, at 13 (arguing
that diversity “will enrich the educational experience of all” through the clash of perspectives); Brief
for Leading Public Research Univs., Fisher I, supra note 184, at 6 (“Current research continues to
show that student bodies diverse in a multitude of ways lead to improved learning outcomes for all
students and benefit the entire educational community.”).
Brown Brief, Fisher I, supra note 184, at 27.
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promoting learning outcomes and preparing students for life and work in an
increasingly diverse society.191 In other words, they were interested in the
social utility that a diverse citizenry can produce, rather than in the
egalitarian value of a diverse citizenry itself. Among the benefits of diversity,
several academic amici also mentioned overcoming stereotypes and
promoting cross-racial understanding. These benefits, however, had almost
no intrinsic egalitarian value, and were meant to allow collaboration and thus
serve the greater good of society.192 Similarly, when the saliency of race was
acknowledged or past discrimination mentioned, it was mostly to explain
how racial diversity, like any other cultural difference, identity, and personal
background, can contribute to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences.193
191

192

193

Brief for California Institute of Technology et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11–
12, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“All students benefit as ‘productive inquiry best
takes place when individuals can explore and share their experience and thoughts as equal members
of our community, uninhibited by prejudice or discrimination.’” (quoting Univ. of Rochester,
Statement of Educational Philosophy, http://www.rochester.edu/diversity/philosophy (last visited Aug. 9,
2012))); ACE Brief, Fisher I, supra note 185, at 16 (“Removal of barriers is thus the essence of American
higher education, necessary both for personal growth and the continued growth of the
Nation[,] . . . because such a society produces ‘more numerous and more varied points of contact’
and ‘a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond.’ Inculcating not only ‘an
ability’ but also ‘an inclination’ ‘to serve mankind, one’s country, friends and family . . . .’” (quoting
JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 101 (Free Press 1966) (1916); then quoting
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE EDUCATION OF YOUTH IN PENNSYLVANIA
30 (William Pepper ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 1931) (1749))); Brief of Amicus Curiae Soc’y of Am. Law
Teachers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11-345) [hereinafter Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers Brief, Fisher I] (“the ‘path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity . . . so that all members of our
heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and
education necessary to succeed in America.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 308, 332–33 (2003))). These examples sounds completely democratic and even
egalitarian, yet in the following sentence the amici continue to argue that “[i]f American businesses
are to achieve a highly qualified and diverse workforce with individuals who have been exposed to
different perspectives, individuals of various races and ethnicities must be granted access to higher
education.” Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers, Fisher I, supra at 12.
See e.g., Brief of the Am. Educ. Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
2–3, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“[S]tudent body diversity leads to
important educational benefits. Among these benefits are improvements in intergroup contact and
increased cross-racial interaction among students; reductions in prejudice; improvements in cognitive
abilities, critical thinking skills, and self-confidence; greater civic engagement; and the enhancement
of skills needed for professional development and leadership.”); Brief of Appalachian State Univ. et
al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345)
(“Higher levels of cross-racial interactions on a campus . . . ‘better prepare[ ] students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331)).
Brief for Amicus Curiae Ass’n of Am. Law Schools in Support of Respondents at 24, Fisher I, 133
S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“It remains inescapably true that members of racial minorities
often possess experiences and perspectives not shared by their white peers. . . . Token minority
representation will not produce the kind of learning environment that fosters an excellent legal
education.”); Brown Brief, Fisher I, supra note 184 at 11 (“To say that race continues to matter is to
acknowledge forthrightly that, for many reasons—including the frustrating persistence of
segregated schools and communities—race continues to shape the backgrounds, perspectives, and
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The most prominent exception to this trend of utilitarian diversity was an
amicus brief submitted by a group of constitutional scholars,194 explaining
that Grutter’s interpretation of diversity allows “forward-looking measures
that call for the sensitive use of race to foster equality in education.”195 It is
in light of this exception that we can see what the vast majority academic
amici were “missing.” Thus, at the time of Fisher I, the connection between
diversity and equality had been loosened and the utilitarian benefits that flow
from diversity were portrayed as the superior mission of higher education.
The history of racism was ignored and the persistence of racial hierarchies
was mystified, as race became just one of many elements of applicants’
identity that can promote robust discussions and enhance the level of
training.
This strong trend away from the egalitarian approach for diversity was
only amplified by non-academic public amici. The United States asserted that
diversity is absolutely necessary for military and federal agencies to fulfill
their missions. 196 Building a diverse force is nothing less than a strategic
imperative,197 and a diverse officer corps is essential for officers’ ability to lead
the enlisted ranks.198 “[T]o be effective,” the United States added, “we have
to look like America. We have to understand and reflect the communities
we serve.”199 These interests, “including military readiness, [and] national
security,” the brief added, “will be more readily achieved if the pathways to
professional success are visibly open to all segments of American society.”200
These interests, the brief continues, are “not simply a matter of civic
responsibility; it is a pressing necessity in an era of intense competition in the
global economy and ever-evolving worldwide national-security threats.”201
Thus, while this brief vindicates a pluralistic vision of America, unlike the

194
195

196
197

198
199

200
201

experiences of many in our society, including Amici’s students.”).
Brief Amici Curiae of Constitutional Law Scholars & Constitutional Accountability Ctr. in Support
of Respondents at 21, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
Id. at 20–21 (“Grutter recognized that it is constitutionally permissible to take race into account to
ensure that ‘the path to leadership be visibly open’ . . . [and] Grutter held that the government may
enact forward-looking measures that call for the sensitive use of race to foster equality in education.”
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332, 333)).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter United States Brief, Fisher I].
Id. (quoting DEP’T OF DEF., DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION STRATEGIC PLAN—2012 TO 2017 3 (2012),
http://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD_Diversity_Strategic_Plan_%20final_as%2
0of%2019%20Apr%2012%5B1%5D.pdf).
Id.
Id. at 15 (quoting Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI, Speech at the National Conference of the
Historically Black Colleges and Universities: FBI Diversity Employment in a New Age of Global
Terror (Sept. 17, 2002), (transcript available at https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speeches/fbidiversity-employment-in-a-new-age-of-global-terror) (last visited Apr. 11, 2018)).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 5–6.
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strong connection between democracy and equality that was evident in
Grutter, in Fisher I the democratic dimension was linked and even secondary
to utilitarian interests. For the United States at the time of Fisher I, the
interest in diversity was no longer an interest in “[e]nsuring that public
institutions, especially educational institutions, are open and accessible to a
broad and diverse array of individuals, including individuals of all races and
ethnicities,”202 as it was at the time of Grutter. Instead, diversity was now an
interest in a well-functioning military and administration, and equality was a
byproduct, but not a goal. Thirty-seven former high-ranking officers and
civilian leaders of the military added that a diverse officer corps is crucial for
the effectiveness of the military because it is more likely to carry cultural
sensitivity and foreign language skills to succeed in today’s wars.203 Other
public amici, such as a group of congressmen, several states, and a number
of senators held a similar interpretation of diversity.204
Aside from a few limited exceptions that articulated the connections
between diversity and equality, 205 the vast majority of amici curiae
supporting UT’s race-conscious admissions policy held a utilitarian—
pedagogical and mostly market-oriented—interpretation of diversity. Civil
society organizations, student organizations, affinity groups, and businesses
emphasized repeatedly that educational diversity is a utilitarian value, meant
to improve the quality of education206 and to prepare graduates to be better
202
203
204

205

206

United States Brief, Grutter, supra note 146, at 19.
Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9–10,
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
See e.g., Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Fisher
I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“[D]iverse educational community enriches the learning
environment for all students and better prepares them to excel in a heterogeneous world.”).
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Coal. of Bar Ass’ns of Color in Support of Respondents at 9–12,
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (articulating both a strong utilitarian interpretation of
diversity, emphasizing how diversity benefits all sectors of legal profession, and an egalitarian one,
and explaining how diversity and representation in the legal profession promotes fairness and access
to positions of public leadership); Brief of the Advancement Project as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondents & Urging Affirmance at 3, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“UT’s
quest for a racially diverse student body is justified, in part, because it represents an attempt by UT
to come to terms with its own history of purposeful discrimination and the history of purposeful
discrimination by the state of Texas.”); Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of the Coal. to Def. Affirmative
Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (“BAMN”)
et al. in Support of the Respondents Urging Affirmance at 5–6, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11-345) (presenting an independent egalitarian defense for race-conscious affirmative action not
tied to an interest in equality or diversity).
For further examples, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Former Student Body Presidents of Univ. of Tex.
at Austin in Support of Respondents at 22, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345)
(“[D]iversity, including diversity of race, socioeconomic class, and national origin, translated into a
broad range of opinions that made classes ‘worth attending.’); Brief of Amicus Curiae Teach For
America, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 4–5, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345)
(“History and research show that students from all backgrounds are best served when their
classrooms and schools are led by a diverse staff of teachers and principals. Yet without a diverse
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and more effective members of society, as workers or leaders.207 This interest
could also be understood as invested in promoting minorities, but the amici
only rarely referred to minorities as beneficiaries of diversity policies, as they
emphasized instead the benefits of an effective workforce and of the quality
of education for all. Furthermore, some amici even made clear that the
benefit of diversity “extends beyond simply developing minority leaders” or
other egalitarian interests, to the positive effects on the society at large.208
They portrayed diversity as an interest in training students to successfully fit
in the workforce and promote the economic well-being of the state and the
nation. 209 Equality might be a means to achieving these goals, or their
byproduct, but it was no longer a goal in itself.
2. Opponents’ Briefs Mirror the Utilitarian Interpretation
The Petitioner in Fisher I and several of her supporters did not challenge
the diversity rationale, but argued that UT’s goal in considering race was not
promoting diversity, but rather the unconstitutional interest in racial
balancing.210 By doing so, they explained what they considered to be the
legitimate interest in diversity: “an inward-facing concept of diversity focused
on enhancing the university experience,” 211 educational dialogue and
exchange of ideas “by keeping minority students from feeling ‘isolated or like
spokespersons for their race.’” 212 This claim was, of course, a strategic

207

208
209

210
211
212

pipeline of graduates from the nation’s leading colleges and universities, our schools will struggle to
recruit the heterogeneous cadre of leaders they badly need.”); Brief for Amici Curiae Fortune-100
and Other Leading American Buss. in Support of Respondents at 2, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)
(No. 11-345) (“For amici to succeed in their businesses, they must be able to hire highly trained
employees of all races, religions, cultures and economic backgrounds. It also is critical
to amici that all of their university-trained employees have the opportunity to share ideas,
experiences, viewpoints and approaches with a broadly diverse student body. To amici, this is a
business and economic imperative.”).
See, e.g., Brief of Former Student Body Presidents, supra note 206, at 20 (“These educational benefits
include, among other things, creating an environment in which a ‘robust exchange of ideas’ can
occur by promoting cross-racial understanding, breaking down racial stereotypes, reducing
isolation that can result in a lack of participation by minorities, better learning outcomes, and better
preparation of students to enter a diverse workforce and society in today’s increasingly global
marketplace.”).
Brief of Distinguished Alumni of the Univ. of Tex. at Austin as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 2, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Small Bus. Owners and Ass’ns in Support of Respondents at 3–4,
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“The ability of small businesses to adapt quickly to
changing market conditions – including changes in the demographic make-up and global nature of
the market – has proven a necessary component of their success. This distinctive feature of small
business, however, requires continuing access to a workforce ‘trained through wide exposure’ to the
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”).
Brief for Petitioner at 19, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003)); see also Brief for Amici Curiae
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argument trying to narrow the interest of diversity. However, it also indicates
that, at the time of Fisher I, opponents of race-conscious affirmative action
acknowledged diversity to be a compelling interest, but only as long as it is
meant to promote the quality of education.

B. Fisher I and the Missing Egalitarian Interpretation
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit on the application of strict
scrutiny standard of review, demanding a closer judicial review on raceconscious admissions programs. The Court held that UT must demonstrate
“that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice” before it
turns to considering the applicant’s race.213 Without saying much else, the
Court remanded the case for review.
The Court did not provide any new vision of diversity. Instead it followed
both Bakke and Grutter. Restating Bakke, the Court distinguished diversity
from forbidden racial balancing, 214 and held that the interest in the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body serves different
values, “including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial
isolation and stereotypes.”215 The interest in diversity, the Court said, citing
Bakke and Grutter, is not just an interest in simple ethnic diversity, but
“encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”216
While not attributing any new values to diversity, the Court also did not refer
to all of the interests previously recognized by the Court. Most notably,
Justice O’Connor’s egalitarian interpretation of diversity as an interest in
ensuring that the “path to leadership” is “visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity”217 was missing from the
opinion. 218
The diversity rationale was not challenged in this case, and therefore at
no point was the Court required to provide an account of diversity. However,
the partial way it described the benefits of diversity, confined to utilitarian
educational benefits, indicates that the Court at the time of Fisher I, perhaps
following the amicus briefs, was less receptive to an egalitarian understanding
of diversity.

213
214
215
216
217
218

Current and Former Fed. Civil Rights Officials in Support of Petitioner at 17, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978);
then citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31).
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
Id. at 2419.
Id. at 2418.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411.
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V. FISHER II: A RE-OPENED SPACE?
After the Supreme Court remanded the case in Fisher I in July 2014, the
Fifth Circuit, applying a stricter standard of scrutiny, affirmed UT’s raceconscious admissions policy once again. 219 The petitioner, Abigail Fisher,
claimed that the University had not articulated its compelling interest with
sufficient clarity and that the consideration of race was not narrowly tailored
because the University had in place a ‘top ten percent plan,’ a successful raceneutral alternative.220
A. More of the Same Market-Driven Diversity in the Fisher II Briefs
Once again, UT had to defend its consideration of race as part of a
holistic policy. In so doing, it articulated essentially the same utilitarian
diversity interest in promoting “learning outcomes,” arguing that it “better
prepare[s] students for an increasingly diverse work force, for civic
responsibility in a diverse society, and for entry into professions, where they
will need to deal with people of different races, cultures, languages, and
backgrounds.”221 UT argued that the use of race as part of the holistic review
is narrowly tailored, despite the relative success of the ‘top ten percent plan,’
and emphasized the individualized, rather than group, elements that
constitute diversity—overcoming adversity, socioeconomic factors or special
circumstances, such as race.222 With this focus, UT diverged from its brief
in Fisher I and did not even cite Grutter’s interest “in ensuring that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals.”223
Social mobilization around UT’s admissions policy did not quiet down
in Fisher II. Sixty-eight amici curiae briefs were submitted in support of UT
and fourteen in support of the petitioner.224 Many amici, however, filed the
exact same briefs they had filed in Fisher I. Others made only minor changes,
and in any case, they did not articulate any new interpretation of diversity.
219
220
221
222

223
224

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 644, 654.
Brief for Respondents at 26, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981).
See id. at 33–34 (“Just as overcoming adversity may distinguish an applicant, minority or otherwise,
so too may showing an ability to cross racial lines and maneuver outside one’s ‘bubble’ . . . . Seeking
diversity within diversity underscores that it is not ‘all about race’ . . . every student brings ‘a lot of
other diversity pieces with them,’ like ‘geographic diversity . . . socioeconomic diversity . . . the type
of school [a student] came from, . . . [the type of community he grew up in] rural, inner city,
suburban . . . [his] background growing up . . . .’” (quoting Joint Appendix at 257a, 360a, 363a,
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981))).
Brief for Respondents at 40, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 322).
For a complete list of amicus briefs submitted in both cases, see Office of the Vice President for
Legal Affairs, U.S. Supreme Court (2011), UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN https://legal.utexas.edu/scotus2011 (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
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Thus, in the interest of brevity and in an effort to avoid an unnecessary
repetition, this Article does not provide a detailed description of the amicus
briefs filed in Fisher II. In short, with a few exceptions of amicus briefs that
emphasized both utilitarian benefits and the remedial or distributive
potential of race-conscious affirmative action,225 the vast majority of amici
supporting UT’s admissions policy followed the same utilitarian
interpretation of diversity that was dominant in the Fisher I briefs.226 Even
though some amicus briefs cited Grutter and did mention the interest in
ensuring “that the path to leadership be visibly open” or other egalitarian
claims, these briefs usually ascribed to other utilitarian pedagogical and
mostly market-driven interests.227
B. Deference as Space for Meaning-Making in Fisher II
On June 23, 2016, the Court announced its decision in Fisher II, 228
allowing race-conscious affirmative action to continue. Justice Kennedy—
225

226

227

228

See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars & Constitutional Accountability Ctr. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 5, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (arguing that
affirmative action aligns with the original meaning of the 14th Amendment, which aims to ensure
equality of opportunity to all persons regardless of race); Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Cedric
Merlin Powell et al. in Support of Respondents at 2–4, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14981) (arguing that “the notion that the Constitution is colorblind has no basis in the original intent
of the Fourteenth Amendment or Brown”).
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Council on Educ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 5, Fisher
II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“The nation’s colleges and universities seek student body
diversity in pursuit of educational excellence. They must prepare students who will have to navigate
a nation more diverse, and a world more interconnected, than ever before.”); Brief for Soc’y of Am.
Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13–14, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016)
(No. 14-981) (“Studies have indicated that diversity in classroom conversations better prepares
students to deal with global clients and colleagues”); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Univ. of N.C. at
Chapel Hill in Support of Respondents at 2, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“[A]
diverse campus better prepares its students for participation in a diverse society and global
economy.”); Brief of Cal. Inst. of Tech. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10,
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“In addition to promoting better learning outcomes,
a diverse university community better prepares students for success in our increasingly diverse,
increasingly global society.”).
See Brief for the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3–18, Fisher
II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (arguing that in order “[t]o remain effective, the legal
profession must reflect the changing demographics of the United States’ population.”); Brief of
Brown Univ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 12–14, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14981) (citing Grutter’s different rationales and explaining that institutions’ interest in diversity is
derived from their educational mission to “develop active and engaged citizens equipped to handle
the problems of a rapidly evolving world”); Brief of Leading Public Research Univs. et al. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“The
university aims to further the causes of democracy and justice by opening pathways to leadership
for members of traditionally underrepresented minority groups. Developing a vibrantly diverse
campus not only creates opportunities for members to advocate for their own communities, but is
also critical for multicultural understanding and collaboration in a deeply interconnected world.”).
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016).

1192

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:5

who had been a long-time skeptic of race conscious affirmative action —
delivered the opinion of the Court and affirmed that “the educational benefits
that flow from student body diversity” are a compelling state interest.229
Fisher II boiled down to two major questions: (1) what kinds of diversity
are compelling? (2) And how much diversity is enough diversity?230 Justice
Kennedy provided hints and guidelines. On the first question he held that
diversity should not be assembled according to a single metric, such as class
rank, that captures some elements of diversity and misses others. 231 More
generally, Kennedy added that diversity takes many forms and has many
dimensions,232 and listed all the interests in diversity that UT identified in its
brief.233 With respect to the second question, Kennedy asserted that “[a]
university’s goals cannot be elusory or amorphous—they must be sufficiently
measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach
them.” 234 But Kennedy did not provide any binding answer to these
questions. Instead, he took a step back and determined that only the
universities themselves can answer those questions:
Considerable deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible
characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and
educational mission. But still, it remains an enduring challenge to our
Nation’s education system to reconcile the pursuit of diversity with the
constitutional promise of equal treatment and dignity.235

As Richard T. Ford recognized, this was a big shift in the Court’s, and in
Justice Kennedy’s, approach to affirmative action.236 Over the past decade,
229
230

231

232

233

234
235
236

Id. at 2210 (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013)).
Richard Thompson Ford narrows it down only to the second question of “how much diversity is
enough?” I read the case as also raising the question of what kinds of diversity should be valued.
See Richard T. Ford, Did the Supreme Court Just Admit Affirmative Action is About Racial Justice?, VOX (July
5, 2016, 12:02 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/7/5/12085412/-supreme-court-affirmativeaction-decision-racial-justice-fisher-abigail-diversity.
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (“Class rank is a single metric, and like any single metric, it will
capture certain types of people and miss others. . . . Indeed, to compel universities to admit students
based on class rank alone is in deep tension with the goal of educational diversity as this Court’s
cases have defined it.”).
Id. at 2210 (“As the University examines this data, it should remain mindful that diversity takes
many forms. Formalistic racial classifications may sometimes fail to capture diversity in all of its
dimensions . . . .”)
Id. at 2211 (articulating Texas’s goals of “the destruction of stereotypes,” the “promot[ion of] crossracial understanding,” the “preparation of a student body” “for an increasingly diverse workforce
and society,” the “cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,” and
providing “an ‘academic environment’ that offers a ‘robust exchange of ideas, exposure to differing
cultures, preparation for the challenges of an increasingly diverse workforce, and acquisition of
competencies required of future leaders.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Supplemental Joint Appendix at 1a, 23a, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981)).
Id. at 2211.
Id. at 2214 (emphasis added).
Ford, supra note 230 (“[Fisher II] marks a turning point in the long controversy surrounding raceconscious admissions policies and perhaps an important shift in the orientation of the Supreme
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the Court had minimized its willingness to allow the use of race as an
affirmative measure: in 2007, in a case called Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,237 the Court invalidated voluntary high
school integration efforts that made use of racial criteria. Add to that the
ruling in Fisher I, which seemed to suggest that the majority of Justices had
real doubts about the constitutionality of the use of race in admissions
programs.238 And most recently in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
(2014),239 the Court affirmed a state ban on the use of race in affirmative
action efforts in higher education and other realms. In contrast to these
cases, which posed direct and indirect constraints on affirmative action in
higher education and on the vocabulary for public discourse about diversity,
in Fisher II, the Court took a step back and invited universities to define their
own interest in diversity.
In its final section, the Article employs this historical account of diversity’s
transformation in order to start exploring the stakes in framing diversity in
one way or another, inviting universities and others to consider these
tradeoffs in making claims about diversity.
VI. DIVERSITY – WHAT HAS GONE WRONG?
A. Why Has the Utilitarian Conception of Diversity Prevailed? Or, Did Diversity Go
Wrong?
The following sections of the Article suggest that the transformation of
diversity as a legal justification—from an egalitarian understanding to a
dominant utilitarian conception—impoverishes the public discourse on
racial justice and risks the long-term struggle for racial equality. Yet, before
discussing the price of adopting the business case for diversity and
abandoning the egalitarian one, it seems necessary to situate this
transformation in a historical context and ask why the utilitarian conception
has prevailed. This allows us to discuss the tradeoffs entailed in adopting
such an approach and to then consider any normative implications it might

237

238
239

Court as well. Justice Kennedy, long the pivotal swing vote on the Court and a skeptic of affirmative
action, voted to uphold UT’s policy.”).
551 U.S. 701, 707 (2007) (“Parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these
plans solely because of their race brought suit, contending that allocating children to different public
schools on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.
The Court Appeals below upheld the plans. We granted certiorari, and now reverse.”)
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–20 (2013) (requiring that reviewing courts independently explore
whether the university could have obtained its objective of diversity with race-neutral alternatives).
134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (“This case is not about how the debate about racial preferences
should be resolved. It is about who may resolve it. . . . Deliberative debate on sensitive issues such
as racial preferences all too often may shade into rancor. But that does not justify removing certain
court-determined issues from the voters’ reach. Democracy does not presume that some subjects
are either too divisive or too profound for public debate.”)
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have.
Trying to understand what has caused the transformation in the meaning
of diversity between the Michigan cases and the Fisher litigation, it appears
impossible to reach one conclusive answer. Instead, in what follows, I
explore three explanations that could have played a role in the take-over of
utilitarian diversity: a political account of why certain characteristics of the
utilitarian conception might have made it attractive grounds for broad
political agreement; a narrow strategic explanation concerned with the
changing makeup and ideology of the Court; and a brief overview of the
much broader shift towards a neo-liberal paradigm. These explanations are
not mutually exclusive.
1. Utilitarian Diversity and Political Compromise
Diversity, in its current formulation, is at the heart of a political
consensus. Opponents of affirmative action no longer challenge the
compelling nature of diversity, and the debate now centers on how diversity
ought to be achieved. The utilitarian conception of diversity seems to have
contributed, to say the least, to the formation and success of this political
compromise. Utilitarian diversity is consensual exactly because it does not
entail moral commitments to remedial or distributive values, which not all
segments of society share.240 Furthermore, utilitarian interests avoid much
of the critique and controversy that was pointed at the remedial justification
for affirmative action. It builds upon forward-looking pedagogical needs for
multiplicity of intellectual perspectives and on market-driven interests, rather
than on redressing historical events that, over time, some argue, have lost
their claim on how institutions of higher education ought to be structured.241
Similarly, because utilitarian interests do not rely on notions of group
disadvantages, but on the positive plurality of ideas and experiences of
students from all segments of society, they avoid stereotyping, which is often
associated with the remedial and distributive conceptions. In other words, it
offers a nonstigmatizing justification to give preference to members of
targeted groups: they contribute valuable features to classroom discussion
240

241

See ROSENFELD, supra note 28, at 94 (“Thus, if one seeks to justify affirmative action in favor of a
group as leading to the maximization of welfare, it becomes unnecessary to confront the arguments
against such policy in the context of compensatory justice—namely, that because not all individual
members of the group have experienced first-order discrimination, compensatory justice does not
justify group-based preferential treatment. Similarly, in the context of distributive justice, by
focusing exclusively on welfare maximization, the utilitarian need not be concerned by the fact that
preferential treatment in favor of a particular group tends to favor its most qualified members at
the expense of its least qualified ones.”).
See ANDERSON, supra note 31, at 141 (“[The diversity model] is future-oriented, locating the point
of affirmative action in continuing institutional needs for epistemic diversity rather than in receding
events that, over time, lose their claim on how current institutions should be structured.”).
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and by that advance the university’s mission.242 Another clear advantage of
the utilitarian case for diversity is that it associates racial preferences with
improving the educational conditions for all students and the society at large,
rather than helping a favored group. 243 In doing so, utilitarian diversity
portrays affirmative action as an educational policy that benefits everyone
and therefore avoids the “innocent white” objection.244
These rhetorical, symbolic, and actual advantages of the utilitarian
conception of diversity make diversity an attractive ground for vast political
consensus. It aims to advance broadly shared interests that potentially
benefit everyone, while dodging the major objections remedial and
distributive values raise. Proponents of affirmative action have surely taken
these advantages into consideration in structuring their arguments before the
Court. Nonetheless, these advantages fail to fully explain why the embrace
of utilitarian interests involved the retreat from egalitarian values, especially
after the Grutter decision that articulated both utilitarian and egalitarian
conceptions of diversity. The two explanations below add some historical
context that starts to provide an answer to this question.
2. Utilitarian Diversity and the Court
At least in part, the turn to utilitarian diversity in the Fisher litigation was
a strategic reaction to the shift in the composition of the Court: while in the
Michigan cases the swing vote on the bench was Justice O’Connor, at the
time of Fisher, it was Justice Kennedy, who by then dissented in Grutter,245 and
rejected the use of race in K-12 admissions policies. 246 Advocates of
affirmative action must have taken this into consideration when framing their
interest in diversity, strategically aiming to a less receptive Justice whose vote
was likely to decide the case.
242
243

244

245

246

Id.
See Jeffries, supra note 67, at 7 (“Most important, diversity put the justification for racial preferences
squarely on improving the educational experience of all students, rather than on helping a favored
few.”).
For an account of the “innocent white” objection see David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative
Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 805–
07 (1991); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HARV. L. REV. 78, 96–97 (1986) (presenting the advantages of diversity as a forward-looking
utilitarian value that remedies the “sins of discrimination past”).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
did not apply strict scrutiny, thereby undermining “both the test and its own controlling
precedents”).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my view the state-mandated racial
classifications at issue, officials labels proclaiming the race of all persons in a broad class of citizens—
elementary school students in one case, high school students in another—are unconstitutional as
the cases now come to us.”).
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More broadly, in those years the Court had grown more conservative.
Kenji Yoshino suggests that the Court suffered from a “pluralism anxiety”—
a fear arising from the influx of immigrants or newly visible groups of
people—leading to growing limitations on equal protection jurisprudence as
part of a larger shift from equality- to liberty-based rights.247 Nancy Leong
argues that as a result of this shift towards conservatism and the reluctance of
the Court to accept race-based preferences on remedial grounds, “advocates
of race-conscious policies in both employment and education increasingly
relied on the interest in diversity as their most promising legal strategy.”248
Adding to this account, I suggest that these growing conservative trends lead
proponents of affirmative action to eventually adopt the utilitarian conception
of diversity and abandon its egalitarian interpretations.
3. Utilitarian Diversity, Neoliberalism and Corporate Diversity
The utilitarian shift that this Article describes might also reflect a much
larger shift to a market-driven paradigm. Scholars have investigated the
takeover of neoliberal and market-driven ideologies in a variety of
domains,249 and commentators have described the rise of such ideologies and
their manifestation in colleges and universities. They explained how
institutions of higher education have been increasingly operating according
to business principles and motivations, 250 and denounce the prosperity of
career-oriented education at the expense of the humanities.251 Dave Hill and
Ravi Kumar explain that “[t]he restructuring of the schooling and education
systems across the world is part of the ideological and policy offensive by
neoliberal capital.” 252 In the shadow of an overall turn to a neoliberal
paradigm, it is easier to understand the growing dominancy of market-driven

247
248
249
250

251

252

Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747–48, 751–54 (2011).
Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2163 (2013).
For an extensive survey, see generally David Harvey, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2015)
(describing the neoliberal turn in the United States from the 1970s to the 2000s).
See generally LAWRENCE BUSCH, K NOWLEDGE FOR SALE: THE NEOLIBERAL TAKEOVER OF
HIGHER EDUCATION (2017) (explaining how the focus of higher education shifted to competition,
metrics, consumer demand, and return on investment).
See e.g., HENRY GIROUX, NEOLIBERALISM’S WAR ON HIGHER EDUCATION (2014) (describing
how market-driven ideology and practice have radically reshaped the nature of higher education,
and calling for an intervention to save universities as democratic sites of critical learning); Heidi
Tworek, The Real Reason the Humanities are ‘in Crisis,’ ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/12/the-real-reason-the-humanities-arein-crisis/282441/ (arguing that most of the decline in enrollment in the humanities happened in
1970 to 1985 due to women enrolling in career-oriented majors, but that those majors did not
substantially affect the employment outcomes of women graduates, indicating that the gender wage
gap was not due to and cannot be fixed by a difference in the practicality of career choice).
Dave Hill & Ravi Kumar, Introduction: Neoliberal Capitalism and Education, in GLOBAL NEOLIBERALISM
AND EDUCATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (Dave Hill & Ravi Kumar eds., 2009).
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arguments in the realm of higher education. In such times, when higher
education is being privatized and commodified, it is not surprising that the
rhetoric we find in educational missions of universities or in the briefs
referring to the goals of higher education, increasingly builds on market-logic
and is deeply invested in economic and other measurable interests.
Relatedly, scholars describe how in the 1980s and, especially, the 1990s,
the business case for diversity in the workplace flourished and gradually took
the place of more traditional affirmative action.253 This shift in the corporate
arena emerged before, and infiltrated the educational realm and influenced
it. As Ben Gose explains, “universities are following the lead of the corporate
world, where chief diversity officers have been in vogue since the 1990s.”254
The spillover of the business case for diversity from the corporate arena to
higher education, along the broader neoliberal trends taking over higher
education provide some historical context to the shift in the meaning of
diversity and help understand why recently the utilitarian conception has
come to dominate.
Neither one of these explanations provides a conclusive answer to the
question of why the utilitarian conception of diversity has prevailed or why the
shift was so extreme and broad. Still, together these explanations contribute
to our understanding as they situate this process in a political and historical
context. These explanations also suggest that adopting a utilitarian approach
to diversity had clear political, strategic, and actual benefits. Thus, it seems
safe to assume that the described shift contributed to the survival of affirmative
action on campus and in courts. Taking those clear benefits into account, this
Article proceeds to discuss the possible costs of adopting such a total utilitarian
conception of diversity. This Article has no interest in finding anyone at
historical fault. Instead, in what follows, it explores the tradeoffs encompassed
in this shift. In its final part, the Article builds on this investigation to suggest
that a more balanced approach to diversity should be restored.
B. Diversity Resignfied: from an Egalitarian Ideal to a Diluted Utilitarian Interest
The Article opened with this inquiry: when do diversity claims promote
equality and when do they inhibit it?
253

254

See, e.g., Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer
Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 960, 961, 971 (1998) (providing
a historical account of affirmative action in the workplace and describing how equal opportunity
measures were recast as diversity initiatives); David B. Oppenheimer, The Disappearance of Voluntary
Affirmative Action from the US Workplace, 24 J. POVERTY & SOC. JUST. 37, 44–46 (2016) (describing
the transformation from affirmative action to diversity management in the workplace and
highlighting its potential cost on racial minorities and women).
Ben Gose, The Rise of the Chief Diversity Officer, CHRON. HIGH. EDUC. (Sept. 29, 2006),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Rise-of-the-Chief/7327.
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Many scholars have recognized the value of diversity as a rationale for
affirmative action. Some, like many of the amici, tried to explain how
diversity in itself can be a positive good to our workforce, educational
mission, or democracy.255 Duncan Kennedy even argues for an expansion
of our current commitment to cultural diversity, aiming to comply with the
democratic principle of representation.256 Others have valued diversity for
its consensual status257 and argued that despite its disadvantages, diversity
serves as a useful political compromise that allows universities to continue
practicing affirmative action. 258 Kathleen M. Sullivan, former dean of
Stanford Law School, urged courts to stop seeing affirmative action as a
penalty of the past and invited them to embrace diversity as a prospective
rationale that serves present and future benefits of institutions. “[B]y turning
to such forward-looking justification,” she explained, “the Court might more
effectively quiet protests about windfalls to nonvictims and injustice to
innocents than it has by treating affirmative action as penance for past
sins.” 259 Reva Siegel suggested that those Justices who embraced the
diversity rationale were motivated by concerns about social cohesion, trying
to avoid the threats that a more direct rationale for affirmative action might
pose.260 While one does not have to embrace all these values, it is impossible
to ignore the strength of the diversity rationale and the major role it has
played in the survival of affirmative action.
Critics, on the other hand, warned that diversity, as opposed to the
abandoned remedial rationale, is far from a viable means of ensuring
affirmative action.261 Derrick Bell argued that diversity is actually “a serious
distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice.”262 Richard T.
Ford added that “a central function of ‘diversity’ is to finesse, if not obscure
255

256
257

258

259
260
261
262

See, e.g., RICHARD D. BUCHER & PATRICIA L. BUCHER, DIVERSITY CONSCIOUSNESS: OPENING
OUR MINDS TO PEOPLE, CULTURES, AND OPPORTUNITIES (2004) (describing how diverse schools
and workplaces allow us to communicate and collaborate more successfully); LEVINSON, supra note
5, at 1–54. For an account of Grutter and the potential benefits of diversity for democracy, see Post,
supra note 63, at 60–64.
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L. J. 705,
712–721 (1990).
See SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 12 (“In the pantheon of unquestioned goods, diversity is right up
there with progress, motherhood, and apple pie.”); Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 573, 578 (2000) (“[I]t is becoming ever more difficult to find anyone who is willing to say, in
public, that institutional or social homogeneity is a positive good and diversity a substantive harm.”).
See Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1668, 1707–08 (1997) (suggesting that diversity, a rationale for affirmative action, has become “a
popular alternative to the remediation of socioeconomic disadvantage”).
Sullivan, supra note 244, at 97.
Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1294 (2011).
See supra notes 73–76.
Bell, supra note 8, at 1622.
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the salience of contemporary racism,” 263 as it “enables courts and
policymakers to avoid addressing directly the barriers of race and class.”264
Kenneth Nunn added that diversity “allows people of color to be used for the
purposes of the educational institution and ultimately for the benefit of white
students and their educational needs.”265 Others tie diversity to the concept
of identity politics and argue that it would “fumble American society’s
extraordinary opportunities to build an economy and a civic culture.”266
So, does diversity promote equality or inhibit it? Drawing on the
historical account of diversity’s transformation, I argue that neither side has
a full understanding of what is at stake in making diversity claims and that
the answer is more complex. Parts III and IV of this Article show how
understandings about diversity shifted from notions about rectifying past
injustice and distribution towards utilitarian interests and market benefits.
But should this account matter when evaluating the relationship between
diversity and equality? I argue that it does, in two significant ways. First,
neither the praises of diversity nor its critiques are fully accurate as long as
they hold the interest in diversity to have a fixed value. In other words, the
social function of diversity changes with its constitutional meaning, through
debates and over time. This means that the diversity compromise today
might have different costs and benefits than it did at the time of Bakke.
Second, in evaluating the stakes of making diversity claims today, I argue
that one needs to understand not only the current popular understanding of
it, but also the transformation that charged it with values over time.
263

264

265
266

RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 52 (2005); see also Richard T. Ford, Beyond
“Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 46–47
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (arguing that Bakke changed the racial landscape on
American college campuses and that “[t]he Powell opinion silently institutionalized an ethnicity
model of race that emphasizes cultural difference over status hierarchy. In the ethnicity paradigm,
the position of blacks is analogous to that of, say, Italian Americans: both have distinctive cultural
backgrounds and therefore may contribute a unique perspective to the university environment.”);
Malamud, supra note 258, at 1708–09 (arguing that educational institutions’ efforts to promote
diversity through affirmative action programs “generates a nonuniform set of institutional
expectations for the diverse and nondiverse candidates who are selected. The White candidates are
there to do their jobs . . . . The diverse candidates must do their jobs, be role models, and teach the
rest of the workforce how the world looks from their diverse perspectives. They can never be at
peace in the same way as those whose right to be on the job is socially constructed as based on their
pure individual merit.”).
See Bell, supra note 8, at 1622; see also WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE TROUBLE WITH DIVERSITY:
HOW WE LEARNED TO LOVE IDENTITY AND IGNORE INEQUALITY 19–20 (2006) (arguing that the
American obsession with racial diversity masks the “real problem” of socioeconomic inequality).
Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-End, 35 PEPP. L. REV 705, 723 (2008).
See Jim Sleeper, What NY Times Op-Ed Writer Mark Lilla Gets Wrong About ‘Identity Liberalism,’
ALTERNET, (Nov. 21, 2016, 8:44 AM), https://www.alternet.org/election-2016/what-ny-timesop-ed-writer-mark-lilla-gets-wrong-about-identity-liberalism.
For a more comprehensive
discussion, see JIM SLEEPER, LIBERAL RACISM: HOW FIXATING ON RACE SUBVERTS THE
AMERICAN DREAM (1997).
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Let me clarify the second point. In her book from 2012, Fortunes of
Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis, Nancy Fraser
explains how the second-wave feminist critique of gender injustice, which
was meant to expose the structural limitations on women’s equality, was
narrowed down to “identity politics.”267 This allowed neo-liberal capitalism
to rely on feminist ideals for legitimation, without changing the practices or
structures that are responsible for women’s continuous economic
subordination.268 In doing so, she develops the concept of resignification by
which prior strands of critique or reformative ideals are taken up in a diluted
and narrow way that can help the system gain legitimacy without disrupting
its overall practices and structure.269 These ideals, she explains, are being
resignified and thereby enriched with a higher moral significance that
legitimates the status quo.270
Diversity, I argue, was resignified—neither by opponents of affirmative
action, nor by its proponents, but in the interaction between the two that
took place around the Fisher litigation. Diversity, as the Article shows, was
not adopted as an egalitarian rationale, but rather as a political compromise
that emphasized its educational benefits but left its definition at least
somewhat open-ended.271 Social movements, university officials, and finally
the Grutter’s Court infused diversity with prospective and retrospective
egalitarian aspirations that reiterated diversity as a standard of critique for
racial disparities and as an ideal for social reform. For a long time, diversity
embodied a connection to the history of state-enforced hierarchies as well as
a commitment to egalitarian social change.272 Yet, these convictions shifted.
When social mobilization around the Fisher litigation spiked, diversity
became a market-based interest celebrating different cultures and
backgrounds. However, it was decoupled both from the history of race
discrimination and from aspirations to dismantle its persistence.273 Diversity
became an ever more popular goal of social reform and a desirable moral
standard for racial justice—aspired to by universities,274 and advocated for
267
268
269

270
271
272
273
274

See Fraser, supra note 19, at 219.
Id. at 219–20.
Id. at 217–23. In developing the concept, Fraser builds on LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO,
THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 3–4 (Gregory Elliott trans., 2005), which explains how capitalism
remakes itself, in part by co-opting strands of critique directed against it.
See Fraser, supra note 19, at 220–21.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.A.
See, e.g., Mission Statement, COLUM. UNIV., http://home.columbia.edu/content/mission-statement
(last visited April 30, 2018) (“It seeks to attract a diverse and international faculty and student body,
to support research and teaching on global issues, and to create academic relationships with many
countries and regions.”); Mission Statement, UCLA, http://www.studentaffairs.ucla.edu/MissionStatement (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (“In all of our pursuits, we strive at once for excellence and
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by every sector in society.275 Yet at the same time, diversity was divested
from its remedial and distributive goals, aspiring instead to train students for
the global workforce and foster the economy. This process, in which the ideal
became consensual and simultaneously diluted from its reformist
redistributive goals, works to legitimate the hierarchal status quo and
immunizes those who embrace it—institutions and citizens—from critique,
and thus risk stalling a more structural racial reform.
Amicus briefs are in large part, strategic, and surely they do not represent
the only conversation about race that is taking place in universities, where
many are committed to ideals of racial equality.276 Thus, I do not resist the
notion that doubletalk regarding diversity efforts exists. However, the amicus
briefs, despite their highly strategic nature provide a crack, if not a window
through which to witness the dynamics of popular constitutionalism and the
evolving meaning of diversity.277 Furthermore, even if amicus briefs are a
strategic, it seems that overtime the face has been growing to fit the mask. Diversity,
and in recent years utilitarian diversity, is arguably the predominant form of
public discourse about race. Indeed, university mission statements as well as
diversity reports have drifted from egalitarian and remedial commitments to
a utilitarian celebration of diversity in tandem with the amicus briefs.278 And

275

276

277

278

diversity, recognizing that openness and inclusion produce true quality.”); Diversity & Inclusion,
AMHERST C,, https://www.amherst.edu/amherst-story/diversity (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (“We
believe that a great intellectual community should look like the world.”).
This became evident from the diversity of amici who supported UT in the Fisher litigation, including
States, local governments, the federal government, veterans, civil society organizations, business,
students, and universities. For a detailed account, see supra Part IV.A.1.
See LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 46 (quoting a letter from Jack Balkin) (“I understand ‘diversity’ to be
a code word for representation in enjoyment of social goods by major ethnic groups who have some
claim to past mistreatment.”).
The history of diversity itself reveals that amici did not always make strategic arguments. While
the Bakke Court focused on the instrumental benefits of diversity to the educational process, the
Grutter amici diverged from the Court’s interpretation and insisted on an egalitarian understanding
of diversity. See supra Part III.A.1. Furthermore, scholars of popular constitutionalism traditionally
turn to amicus briefs to learn about popular and professional understandings of the Constitution.
See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 81, at 1439 (“The affirmative action cases are excellent texts to
consider from a social movement perspective because they featured a group of intervenors in Grutter
who styled themselves a ‘mass movement’ for social justice.”); Siegel, supra note 82, at 1395 n.220
(analyzing amicus briefs to learn about the interaction between feminist movement and the courts
in the question of abortion).
For examples of contemporary interpretations of diversity in university documents, see “Diversity
& Inclusion” section of It’s Your Yale, YALE, http://your.yale.edu/community/diversity-inclusion
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (“A diverse workforce and inclusive environment increases productivity,
creates new ideas, performs on a higher level, and enhances Yale’s ability to continue to excel in an
increasingly complex, competitive and diverse world.”); Letter and Memo from Christina H.
Paxon, President, Brown Univ., to Members of the Brown Cmty. (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://brown.edu/web/documents/diversity/actionplan/diap-full.pdf (explaining that diversity is
essential to prepare “students to thrive and lead in the complex and changing settings they’ll
encounter after they graduate”); see also supra notes 221–26 (detailing the interpretation of diversity
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thus, the Article argues that the way we talk and think about diversity in courts
and on campus affects the way we think about racial justice generally. In other
words, the vocabulary for public discourse about racial justice shapes the
conversation, frames commitments, and can affect the way we act. The
resignified diversity framework, I suggest, does this in two significant ways.
First, the public vocabulary regarding race is gradually confined to terms
of culture and identity, rather than a category of power hierarchies. Race,
under the utilitarian discursive regime, became mostly a marker for students’
culture, or background, which can contribute, like a type of commodity, to the
“robust exchange of ideas” and the training of students. Nancy Leong calls
this phenomenon “racial capitalism,” by which she means “commodification
of racial identity, thereby degrading that identity by reducing it to another
thing to be bought and sold.” 279 This process can be further understood
according to Neil Gotanda’s typology of race. 280 Gotanda distinguished
between status-race, formal-race, historical-race, and culture-race. Statusrace means “the traditional notion of race as an indicator of social status.”281
The opposite notion is formal-race, which has no connection to any other
attribute except skin color. Historical race does not apply any essential
meaning to race, but it “embodies past and continuing racial
subordination.”282 And culture-race refers to the culture and community of
the racial group.283 The utilitarian diversity framework, I suggest, works to
limit understandings of race to “culture-race,” and it attributes value to the
other types of race only to the extent that they inform this cultural
conception, which is instrumental to fostering the marked-based celebration
of diversity.284

279
280
281
282
283
284

put forward by the University of Texas in its Fisher II briefing, and how this differed from even the
Fisher I and Grutter conceptions.)
In contrast, many of the materials dated to the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s saw the interest
in diversity as part of their commitment to social justice and equality. See, e.g., RECRUITMENT AND
RETENTION OF MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS ON THE FACULTY AT YALE 1 (1989) (“The full and
successful participation of all segments of the nation’s population in all aspects of our society’s life
is urgently needed. The urgency has special force for the nation’s schools and universities as they
provide the foundation for such participation. . . . The fullest development of our human resources
as well as equity and social justice demand that we at Yale address this issue.”); VISITING
COMMITTEE ON DIVERSITY, DIVERSITY, PLURALISM, AND COMMUNITY AT BROWN 13 (2000)
(“[t]he commitment to diversity involves not only accepting and recognizing difference, but also
challenging the inequities in power . . . .” (quoting Johnnella E. Butler)).
See Leong, supra note 248, at 2152.
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
In some ways, this process is parallel to the color-blind turn in antidiscrimination law, which was
divested from antisubordination and group-based understandings of race to individual ones.
Resisting this shift, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 P HIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
157 (1976) (“It is from this perspective—one of a proscription against status- harm—that
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Second, under the utilitarian paradigm, diversity and its egalitarian
meaning are not goods in themselves, but instruments serving greater goods
of professional success and economic prosperity. The instrumentalization of
diversity, and its egalitarian interpretation, diminishes the value of diversity
as well as equality and lessens the institutional and public committed to it.
More specifically, this prospective functionalist approach to diversity blurs
connections to the history of discrimination and sheds any commitment to
amending its effects. Past as well as present racial disparities become
irrelevant to the mission of higher education. Arguing for the compelling
interest in diversity, universities often referred to their educational mission.
While at the time of the Michigan cases this mission included both
egalitarian, democratic, and utilitarian aspirations,285 at the time of Fisher I it
was mostly confined to the training of students and equipping “professionals
and business leaders to interact with diverse customers, clients, co-workers,
and business partners.”286 Under this vision, the role of higher education is
deprived of previous commitments to foster equality or remedy past
injustices, and instead, universities are conceptualized as training and
networking career centers in which students are both the commodity from
which diversity is ‘made’ as well as its beneficiaries or clients.
Race still shapes educational opportunity. However, the utilitarian
paradigm, I suggest, limits the public vocabulary and imagination from
recognizing this. It fails to identify past and present forms of racial inequality
and their relevance to the mission of higher education, and therefore,
absolves universities from taking a role in fighting systematic inequality and
at the same time immunizes them from being held accountable for it. In
disregarding this systemic inequality, the utilitarian paradigm might gain
popular support for adopting ‘diversity measures,’ but it simultaneously risks
impeding the long-term struggle for racial justice, making us blind and numb
to the ongoing racial stratification. While these costs might sound abstract
or focused on far future concerns, in what follows I suggest that we might
already be witnessing some of this impact in the realm of student activism.
C. Renaming Buildings and Institutions, Safe Spaces, and Trigger Warnings
In recent years, students all over the United States have been mobilizing
around demands for renaming buildings or other structures on campus,

285

286

discriminatory state action should be viewed.”).
See supra Part III.A.I (exploring how many amici in Grutter viewed diversity); see also supra note 269
(explaining how the shift to a more utilitarian view of diversity evolved through a comparison to
the evolution of capitalist ideology).
Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Educ. et al. in Support of Respondents at 6, Fisher II,
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981).
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trigger warnings, and safe spaces. The Article does not presume to provide
a comprehensive account of this movement, nor does it take a stand in this
nuanced debate for or against any of these demands.287 Instead, it proposes
that the recent rise in such demands sparks important questions about the
implications of the ahistorical and market-driven paradigm that has
controlled the conversation of race on campus over the last decade, and can
help us better understand its cost.
Controversies over university building names and symbols began at the
University of Texas in 2010, where a building named after a Ku Klux Klan
member was renamed. 288 Since then, and mostly since 2014, following
students’ protests, buildings associated with white supremacists and slave
owners at institutions such as Duke, Georgetown, and University of Oregon
were renamed. In 2015, Princeton students challenged the name of the
university’s Woodrow Wilson School on the basis of Wilson’s views on race,
but the demand was denied.289 Stanford initiated a study relating to the use
of the name of Junípero Serra, a Catholic missionary who colonized
California for Spain in the 18th century and whose history among Native
Americans is controversial. 290 Harvard Law School decided to alter the
symbol on its shield that was designed after a crest of a slaveholder,291 and at
Yale, after a two year deliberation, it was decided to rename Calhoun College,
named after John C. Calhoun, the American vice president who defended
slavery. 292 The issue of renaming has gathered a great deal of public
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attention, and has been debated by scholars and in the popular media.293
During roughly the same period of time, universities across the country
have been wrestling with student requests for what are known as trigger
warnings. Trigger warnings are explicit alerts for students that the material
they are about to encounter in a classroom can potentially be distressing.294
Some asserted that these warnings should be confined to materials that can
potentially cause symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in victims of
rape or in war veterans, while others advocated for trigger warning in other
potentially upsetting settings. 295 Similarly, safe spaces are places where
students can avoid distressing subjects and confrontations.296 The demand
for safe spaces originally came from women and LGBTQ groups trying to
create spaces free of harassment for all lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender students.297 The term has been expanded to refer to a space for
other individuals who feel marginalized. 298 These requests are often
accompanied by discussions about racial insensitivities, cultural
appropriation, and microaggressions towards students of color. Public
discourse and further mobilization around these issues came to a head in
August 2016 after the University of Chicago’s dean of students sent a
welcome letter to freshmen students, stating that the school does “not support
so-called ‘trigger warnings,’ [it does] not cancel invited speakers because
their topics might prove controversial, and [it does] not condone the creation
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https://messages.yale.edu/messages/University/univmsgs/detail/149000 (last updated Feb. 11,
2017, 2:01 PM).
For an overview of the recent controversies over renaming, see CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH,
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of intellectual ‘safe spaces’ where individuals can retreat from ideas and
perspectives at odds with their own.”299
Of course, each of these demands must be contextualized, discussed and
decided on its own merits. I do not take a stand in this debate, but instead
propose that the costs of adopting a utilitarian approach to questions of racial
justice are evident in these demands in two, somewhat contradictory ways.
First, the movement can be understood as a backlash to the utilitarian
paradigm that has been controlling the conversation on race in the past
decade in courts (briefs and opinions) and on campuses—contesting its
indirect and ahistorical nature, and aspiring to get intuitions to recognize
past injustices as well as to commit, once again, to rectifying them. Second,
the demands students are making appear to be limited by similar conceptions
of race—confined to symbolic notions of identity and culture—and thus risk
reproducing them.
The current wave of student activism seems to be contesting the
dominant approach to questions of race on campus. Students are resisting
their institutions, which they feel fundamentally misunderstand their
experience of race as a category of power that is very present in their lives.
As a Yale senior Aaron Lewis explained, the 2015 protest at Yale was really
“about a mismatch between the Yale we find in admissions brochures and
the Yale we experience every day. They’re about real experiences with
racism on this campus that have gone unacknowledged for far too long.”300
Similarly, students resist the ongoing erasure of the history of racial
oppression in higher education, and aspire to get their universities to
acknowledge, in some way, the wrongs of the past.301 As The Stanford Daily
reported, “[s]upporters of the resolution argue that removing Serra’s name
from buildings is a step toward correcting the erasure of history.” 302
Similarly, in support of retiring the controversial slaveholder’s symbol from
the school’s shield, Harvard students said it was “a symbol of exclusion—a
reminder of an exclusionary past that should have no place in an inclusive
present,” and that it leads students of color “to question whether they are
accepted as equal members of the Law School community, particularly in
299
300
301
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the face of what they experience as other slights.”303 Black Justice League
members at Princeton noted that “they had often felt excluded and
continually if subtly called on to justify their presence at one of the nation’s
top schools. . . . [a]nd for some students, Wilson’s name and image around
campus feel like constant reminders that they are not entirely welcome.”304
An ahistorical understanding of race, it seems, does not reflect the students’
lived experiences, and utilitarian motivations are no longer adequate to
reflect their aspirations for racial justice. Thus, by uncovering what has been
neglected, recent activism highlights the costs of embracing an all-utilitarian
approach to questions of race: institutions that aspire for greater student
diversity, but are somewhat detached from both the history and the current
reality of race in America.
However, the demands that resulted in this backlash, I suggest, are
confined by the very same utilitarian regime and its attendant convictions
about race. And thus, the costs of the utilitarian approach become evident
not only in what universities have been missing, but also in the demands that
define this movement. The recent demands are centered on symbolic
notions of race as identity, asking mainly for cultural recognition rather than
for redistribution.305 In this respect, the movement’s imagination seems to
be limited by the dominant conceptualization of race as a marker of identity
and culture rather than as a category of power hierarchies. The focus on
symbolic demands for cultural recognition I suggest, risks contributing to the
ongoing diversion of institutional attention from the status quo of racial
stratification on and off campus. Furthermore, the demands are often
framed in a manner that does not challenge systematic racism or inequality,
but as requests for removal of or protection from obstacles to learning and
training.306 “You have to do something to . . . make sure that everybody can
be educated,” as one student activist said while articulating her support of
trigger warnings.307 The relatively narrow scope of student demands, their
inward-facing direction, and their utilitarian framing seem to be constrained
by the notion of universities as professional training centers, and reflecting
their inability to conceptualize higher education as a site of social change.
303
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Similarly, while the appeal for renaming is clearly haunted by historical
racial oppression, and demands to stop ignoring it, it risks taking part in the
ongoing erasure of the past. In many instances the demands for renaming
resulted in an establishment of a committee and sparked a time-limited
conversation about the specific request. Thus, the demands have been
successful in provoking discussions about the history of racism in the short
term, but might compromise the ability of universities to engage in such
conversations and struggles in the long term as they eliminate the very relics
that sparked these conversations in the first place.
In an op-ed from November 2016, Mark Lilla voiced a harsh critique of
diversity-discourse and of recent students’ demands, characterizing both as
forms of identity politics:
[T]he fixation on diversity in our schools and in the press has produced a
generation of liberals and progressives narcissistically unaware of conditions
outside their self-defined groups, and indifferent to the task of reaching out to
Americans in every walk of life. . . . By the time they reach college many
assume that diversity discourse exhausts political discourse, and have shockingly
little to say about such perennial questions as class, war, the economy and the
common good. . . . We need a postidentity liberalism, and it should draw from
the past successes of preidentity liberalism. Such a liberalism would
concentrate on . . . the issues that affect a vast majority of them.308

While at first reading, this critique might sound similar to the argument
laid out in this Article, it is distinct and even opposed to it. First and foremost,
nowhere does this Article present an argument against identity politics as a
whole. In contrast, I assume that racial justice requires a richer paradigm
that includes both cultural recognition and material redistribution, rather
than trading one for the other. I recognize that the focus only on one type
of demand might weaken the likelihood of attaining the other.309 Second,
unlike Lilla, I do not prioritize issues of class and war over race because I
recognize, again unlike Lilla, that the recent activism is working against deep
and systemic racial inequality. Instead, my concern is about the students’
choice to present limited demands—in nature and in scope. Furthermore, in
contrast to Lilla, who echoes Walter Benn Michaels310 and argues that race
problems serve as a distraction from the real problem of class inequality, this
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Article points to the ways in which the two problems are still entangled today.
Lastly, I do not believe that the solution is to “concentrate on the issues that
affect a vast majority.” Mainly because fighting racial inequality might never
be a top priority for the majority. If anything, the history of diversity’s
transformation teaches that we should focus more on race, not only as an
element of identity, but also as a category of power.
Universities, student movements, and others who are committed to racial
justice are facing a real dilemma: how to get the majority and courts to adopt
measures to fight inequality without compromising the struggle itself. This
Article is meant to shed light on the dominant way of doing so today—
through diversity claims. I described a rather worrisome development, by
which the current understanding of diversity as a utilitarian value might
endanger the struggle for racial justice more than it promotes it. There is
nothing wrong with expressing the utilitarian benefits of diversity, which are
both real and persuasive, yet it is when this indirect approach dominates the
conversation about race that our institutions risk losing sight of long-term
racial progress, as well as the ability to honestly talk and act against the status
quo of racial hierarchies. I have also showed that in the past, diversity played
a more robust role in unsettling racial hierarchies, but can it do so in the future?
VII. CONCLUSION: DIVERSITY’S FUTURE
Diversity discourse is fundamentally and historically ambiguous and can
accommodate conservative as well as progressive ideals about race and
inequality. It does not necessarily embody egalitarian commitments, but
rather represents an ongoing struggle that can tilt either toward egalitarian
or utilitarian values. In the past decade the market-driven approach to
diversity has become so dominant that it risks undermining the long-term
struggle for racial equality. It is now the time, I suggest, to tilt diversity back
and reinfuse it with egalitarian ideals.
How? Past critiques of diversity urged advocates and the Court to
overthrow the diversity framework as a whole and return to the pre-Bakke
reality of remedial ideals.311 This Article, in contrast, is more realistic and
somewhat more optimistic. Instead of dismissing this entire successful body
of law, it suggests that much can be done under existing equal protection law
and within the diversity framework. More concretely, when making diversity
claims on campus and in court, universities and other advocates of
affirmative action should not automatically embrace a purely utilitarian and
market-driven approach to diversity. Rather, they should attempt to strike a
balance between acknowledging the utilitarian benefits of diversity that make
it popular and easy to live with even for conservatives and the egalitarian
311
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perspective that is at the core of racial justice. One way of doing that is to
return to the Michigan briefs and to Justice O’Connor’s interpretation of
diversity in Grutter, which embraced both utilitarian and democratic values
of equal citizenship, and insisted that diversity also embodies an interest in
ensuring that no group is excluded from participating in public life.
This is a time of great uncertainty in America, and no one knows what
the composition of the Court will be under President Trump, but it seems
safe to assume that it will not become more progressive in the foreseeable
future. What we do have is the most recent decision in Fisher II, in which
Justice Kennedy—who was and is once again the swing Justice on equal
protection cases—affirmed the diversity framework. Adopting the diversity
framework, the Fisher II majority did not further constrain its meaning, but
instead it held that in defining student-body diversity, “[c]onsiderable
deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics,
like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational
mission.” 312 This deference should be understood as an opportunity to
reshape the meaning of diversity and infuse it with new-old meanings. While
remedial interpretations of diversity might strike outside what is central to
the identity of a university and be too far reaching for Justice Kennedy,
Grutter’s forward-looking commitment to equal citizenship as a democratic
ideal can be considered part of an “educational mission” and enjoy the
deference of the court. With more challenges to affirmative action in the
pipeline,313 universities must embrace the diversity framework, and with it
this timely opportunity to reinfuse it with egalitarian meanings that could
change the conversation about race in courts and on campuses.
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